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The  successful  start  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  in  Europe  has
prompted more research into the issue of exchange rate regimes and if there
were any lessons to be drawn from the European experiment for other regions
in the world. We review the relevant issues from an Optimum Currency Area
perspective. The focus on issues relating to the suitability of switching to
a common  currency  based  on  notions  of  economic  distance  and  the
correlation of aggregate economic shocks. The empirical evidence presented
in this paper shows that the cost of monetary union declined substantially in
some target countries while it appears to have risen in others. This leads to
some interesting policy implications also for the new EU members.
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1. Introduction
The  successful  introduction  of  European  Economic  and  Monetary  Union
(EMU) has not only stimulated debate over the choice of exchange rate regimes
but  has  also  prompted  the  question  of  whether  still  fewer  currencies  are
economically desirable (e.g., Dornbusch 2001). Moreover, asizeable literature
has emerged (Eichengreen, 2002b, Hochreiter, Schmidt-Hebbel and Winckler,
2002, Wyplosz 2001a) that examines whether there are any lessons emanating
from the European “Maastricht Model” for other regions such as the Americas,
Australasia, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean (henceforth LAC) for
exchange rate regime choice. Controversy remains regarding the relevance of
Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria for deciding to form amonetary union
on economic grounds. More recently, the traditional but essentially static OCA
criteria  have  been  supplemented  with  a dynamic  version  stressing  the
endogenous properties of these criteria in successful monetary unions (Frankel
and Rose 1998) as well as adding “non-traditional” arguments to the original
set of OCAcriteria. We touch on these innovations in a survey-type discussion
about the choice of exchange rate regimes. The real focus, however, is on the
role of economic shocks and how they proliferate across countries as well as
the role of business cycle synchronicity as these factors are key determinants
for  selecting  an  exchange  rate  regime.  Hochreiter,  Schmidt-Hebbel  and
Winckler (2002) present evidence that the benefit-cost balance in Europe is
favorable for EMU not least because the size of idiosyncratic shocks has
declined and business cycles have become more coincident. The empirical
evidence presented in this paper shows that the cost of monetary union declined
substantially in some target countries while it appears to have risen in others.
Furthermore,  we  study  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of  selecting
alternative exchange rates in three regions (the Americas, Europe and the
Antipodes) and, by way of counterfactual experiments, try to assess whether
the countries under considerations actually did make the right choice.
In a sense then our study represents an assessment of the economic “distance”
between  types  of  exchange  rate  regimes.  Indeed,  we  implement
a straightforward measure of economic distance to evaluate the prospects for
or against further monetary integration. The “Maastricht model”, which offers
a concrete road map for future monetary unions, also points to the need for
binding  fiscal  rules  and  that  a monetary  union  can  be  successfully
implemented without first forming a political union. The political dimension
of the EMU project, important as it is, is not discussed in any detail.The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the “Maastricht Model”
that lies behind Economic and Monetary Union in Europe and relates the
criteria embodied in EMU to the regions considered in this study. Next, we
selectively survey crucial determinants of an optimum currency area, with
a focus on the Americas and the Antipodes, including the role of fiscal policy.
In  Section  4  we  study  the  cost  of  a monetary  union  by  measuring  the
economic distance between various regions. Section 5 implements a simple
structural model that asks how alternative monetary regimes might affect
output growth, inflation and their volatility for selected groups of countries
(Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, the United States, New Zealand,
and Australia)  and  report  on  counterfactual  experiments  to  ascertain  the
consequences of actual monetary regime decisions. Section 6 concludes.
8 Introduction2.  The Maastricht Model
The uniqueness of the Maastricht model for monetary union lies in the
formal  transfer  of  monetary  sovereignty  to  a supranational  monetary
authority,  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (ESCB),  while  fiscal
policies  by  and  large  remain  a national  competence  subject  to  the
constraints set out in the Maastricht Treaty. “Maastricht” thus combines
a monetary policy centralized at the euro area level, dedicated towards the
area-wide  objective  of  price  stability,  and  fiscal  policies  that  are
predominantly geared to national interests. At the same time the Maastricht
model specifies quantitative convergence criteria (contained in Protocol 6
of the Maastricht Treaty) as preconditions for the adoption of the euro and
specifies binding fiscal rules constraining public deficits and public debt.
These rules are centered on the Excessive Deficit Procedure – EDP – (Art.
104  Maastricht  Treaty)  and  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  –  SGP –
(Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact,
Amsterdam  17  June  1997)  as  safeguards  for  sustained  sound  public
finances. Article 99 (European Union Treaty – EUT) specifies procedures
for fiscal policy coordination. The competent bodies for the surveillance of
fiscal policies and fiscal policy coordination are the European Commission
and  the  Council  of  Economics  and  Finance  Ministers  (ECOFIN)
respectively.
According  to  the  Maastricht Treaty,  price  stability  is  considered  a basic
common good of the EU. Other economic policies while remaining under
national competence must, in their implementation, take the price stability
requirement into account. As far as fiscal policy is concerned, excessive
fiscal deficits are to be avoided. Moreover, should they occur, these must be
rectified  as  soon  as  possible  (Art.  104  EUT).  Thus,  if  there  is  an
inconsistency between fiscal and monetary policy, it is not monetary policy
that  has  to  adjust  to  a given  (excessive)  fiscal  policy  as  is  the  case  in
“unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” of Sargent and Wallace but rather it is
fiscal policy that has to adjust as is stipulated in the EDP and the SGP. The
Maastricht  Model  thus  turns  unpleasant  monetarist  arithmetic  into
unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. In other words, the Maastricht Model enshrines
the  notion  of  monetary  dominance  (Hochreiter,  Schmidt-Hebbel  and
Winckler, 2002).
9There has been a lengthy and controversial discussion regarding the wisdom
and usefulness of the Maastricht convergence criteria.
3 The ones receiving the
most criticism are the exchange rate criterion and, above all, the two fiscal
convergence criteria. Regarding to the exchange rate criterion, supporters
argue that participation in the ERM disciplines domestic policies, constrains
exchange  rate  fluctuations  while,  at  the  same  time,  permitting  policy
flexibility. In particular, limitations on exchange rate movements helps meet
other convergence criteria such as the interest rate criterion and, foremost, the
inflation criterion. Critics, on the other hand, argue that the Maastricht Treaty
itself is the disciplining factor for stability-oriented policies and that exchange
rate stability ought to be the economic outcome of such arrangements and
cannot be the outcome of enforced participation in a soft peg arrangement.
Participation in the ERM might even be counterproductive because it might
invite speculative attacks instead. This debate is politically relevant both in
the context of the three current EU members still not having adopted the euro
(Denmark, Sweden and the UK) and the 10 new EU members as of May 2004
required to eventually adopt the euro.
With  regard  to  the  fiscal  convergence  criteria  of  the  Treaty,  virtually  all
aspects have come under severe criticism. Academics and, in the context of
the  more  recent  prolonged  cyclical  weakness  of  the  euro  area  economy,
politicians from France and Italy especially have brought complaints against
the SGP. Others, such as for example the Dutch and the Austrians, are equally
adamant  regarding  the  necessity  of  maintaining  fiscal  rules.
4 The  fiscal
criteria have been criticized as a nuisance, or even economically harmful,
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3 Protocol 6 of the “Maastricht Treaty”
(1) Inflation criterion: an inflation rate not more than 1
1/2 % higher than those of the three
best performing EU countries over the latest 12 months.
(2) Fiscal convergence criteria: These criteria restrict the government budget deficit and the
government debt to certain levels. A country which wants to participate in the EMU may
not have 
– a government budget deficit higher than 3 % of GDP,
– a government debt ratio of more than 60 % of GDPor sufficiently fast approaching that
level.
(3) Interest rate criterion: an average nominal long term interest rate that does not exceed
by more than two percentage points that of the three best performing member states in
terms of price stability.
(4) Exchange rate criterion: participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the
European Monetary System (EMS) within the normal fluctuation margin without severe
tensions for at least two years.
4 “The Dutch government has threatened to sue France for flouting the Maastricht Treaty,
which underpins the euro. Austria’s Finance Minister, Karl-Heinz Grasser, sums up the sense of
injustice. ‘We are punished through higher interest rates and have to pay the bill for the deficits of
the big countries’, he said recently.” (New York Times, 21 September 2003, wk 5).because they are alleged to prevent fiscal policy to play its role as a shock
absorber.  However,  below  we  argue  that  once  the  medium  term  goal  of
a fiscal position in the SGP “close to balance or in surplus” is satisfied, there
is enough inherent flexibility in the SGP to offset “normal” regional shocks.
Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996) point out an additional danger arising
from  fiscal  constraints  within  a monetary  union  composed  of  several
sovereign states. Too much fiscal discipline can impede other, more flexible,
attempts at coordinating stabilization policies. More importantly, the EU is
not designed for wide-ranging union-wide tax transfers and so risk sharing at
the fiscal level is rather limited. However, while such transfers on a EU wide
level  are  not  possible  to  any  large  extent  (limit  of  taxation  of  1.27%  of
EU-wide GDP), there exists a large and well-established transfer system at
the level of national states. At the same time the net benefit of inter-union
transfer systems is not clear. Kletzer and von Hagen (2001) argue that the
welfare effects of such insurance schemes are ambiguous and thus, might
even be unnecessary. Among the original 11 EMU members, as the date for
Stage 3 of EMU approached, there was controversy about the extent to which
some of the candidates fulfilled all of the Treaty conditions, above all the
fiscal criteria. In the final analysis, however, the Treaty provided enough
room for interpretation leaving out, on economic grounds, only Greece from
the first euro wave. Greece, of course, has since joined the euro area in 2001.
5
Let us now examine the extent to which the regions considered in this study
would have complied with the Maastricht convergence criteria in the year
2000, thereby enabling them to qualify for entry into a Maastricht Treaty
inspired  monetary  union  in  2001.  Tables  1  and  2  provide  the  relevant
information for Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the euro area and LAC
respectively. Table 3 repeats the exercise for selected EU accession countries.
As one can see from Table 1, on almost all counts, the first of these three
mentioned  candidate  countries  satisfy  the  Maastricht  convergence  criteria
with  the  exception  of  the  exchange  rate  criterion.  Currently,  Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand are classified as having freely floating exchange
rates,  according  to  both  de  jure  and  de  facto classification  schemes.
Moreover, although all of these central banks are de facto independent from
their respective governments, only New Zealand has de jure autonomy.
The Maastricht Model 11
5 Denmark and the UK relied on their opt-out clause, while Sweden did not meet the exchange
rate criterion. In addition, Sweden has still to fulfill the requirement that the Sveriges Riksbank be
financially independent (cf., ECB Convergence Report 2002: 43 ff), available at www.ecb.int.Table  2 replicates the Maastricht Model for selected LAC countries.
6 One is
immediately  confronted  with  a variety  of  data-related  problems.  First,
financial markets in the Southern cone are not as fully developed as in Europe
or North America. Consequently, the interest rates used here are short-term
money market rates and not the 10 year government bond rate. Second, there
are considerable difficulties in obtaining reliable and comparable public debt
figures. The problem is compounded by the fact that the division between
domestic and foreign debt is likely to be of relatively greater importance for
the LAC countries than for the other countries considered here. Nevertheless,
the available data reveal that while there have been dramatic improvements in
the area of disinflation, nominal interest rates remain high. The available
public debt and deficit data do not appear alarming but they fail to capture the
accumulated  history  of  poor  fiscal  policy,  as  the  Argentine  experience
highlights, as well as the frequent bouts of high inflation in the region.
The picture is also quite mixed for the countries in central and eastern Europe
which will accede to the European Union on May 1, 2004 (Table 3). While
most are still doing well regarding the public debt criterion, the majority of
them still have some, and in some cases, a long way to go before being able
to fulfill the Maastricht deficit criterion. Moreover, countries such as Hungary
or Poland have shown cycles of fiscal consolidation and fiscal lapses, making
any projections rather difficult. Just as has been the case for incumbent EMU
members, the budget deficit criterion will most likely be the most difficult
convergence criterion to be achieved. Interestingly, most recent developments
in the fiscal area have prompted the governments and central banks in some
of the accession countries to become more cautious regarding the likely date
of the introduction of the euro.
As far as the inflation and interest rate criteria are concerned, again, there are
significant  differences  and  data  problems  with  regard  to  interest  rates.
Aprima facie conclusion is that the majority of the accession countries under
consideration is still some way off to fulfill these criteria. Finally, with regard
to the exchange rate criterion, naturally, no country can currently fulfill it
because of the two year ERM II participation requirement. In addition, these
countries’ exchange rate regimes currently cover the whole spectrum from
currency board arrangements (Estonia and Lithuania) to freely floating rates
(Poland). While it is clear that free floats, managed floats without a central
rate to the euro (Slovenia and Slovakia), and pegs to currencies other than the
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6 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay belong to Mercosur. Chile and Mexico
do not.euro (Latvia) are incompatible with ERM II membership, the compatibility of
the other regimes will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
As has been noted above, membership in the ERM was deemed vital to meet
other convergence criteria, especially the inflation criterion. Interestingly, the
candidate countries from North America and the Antipodes opted for afloating
exchange  rate  within  an  inflation  targeting  strategy  and  their  economic
performance  is  broadly  similar  and  likely  superior,  to  that  of  their  EMU
counterparts. Mundell (2000a) has pointed out, and this view coincides with
critics of this particular convergence criterion, that the pursuit of price stability
at large, rather than stubborn adherence to a chosen exchange rate regime,
should be policy makers’ objective. At the same time, the convergence in
inflation rates that emerges from Table 1 supports Mundell’s contention that
wider monetary unions are feasible in the future.
We  would  argue  that  the  data  presented  indicate  that,  according  to  the
Maastricht  model,  some  of  the  countries  under  consideration  could  form
a monetary union. Let us now consider how OCAtheory fits into this picture.
The Maastricht Model 133. Crucial Aspects of Optimum Currency Areas: Selected
Issues
3.1. Background
The literature on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) generally originates with
the  pioneering  work  of  Mundell  (1961). Though  there  have  been  several
important contributions since (e.g., Tavlas 1993, and Isard 1995 are surveys
of the literature) interest in this topic has resurged of late as countries take
stock of the economic consequences of existing exchange rate regimes and
debate  whether  groups  of  otherwise  sovereign  nations  form  an  OCA
7,
especially for the countries under investigation in this study.
Prompted by the European experience, economists have been weighing the
microeconomic benefits and costs against the macroeconomic ones with little
conclusive  evidence  suggestive  of  the  absolute  advantage  of  such  an
arrangement.
8
Among the benefits is the reduction in transactions costs. The most visible
manifestation of such benefits is when individuals no longer have to carry or
exchange several different currencies. Other benefits include the creation of
large regional trading blocks, both as a means of ensuring a sufficiently strong
voice in international trade negotiations and rule setting. Of course, monetary
integration is not a necessary condition for the creation of trading blocks (e.g.,
as  with  NAFTA).  However,  monetary  union  eliminates  the  role  of  the
exchange rate in the calculus of benefits and costs of trading across borders. 
The principal costs of single currency arrangements can be summarized under
the  broad  heading  of  loss  of  sovereignty  over  economic  (and,  possibly,
political) affairs. Moreover, the European experience suggests that creating
a single monetary policy is not enough and that, eventually, fiscal policies
must also be harmonized coordinated in some sense.
While history has proved to be a critical catalyst that permitted national or
regional concerns to be emasculated by some overarching European vision, it
is far from obvious that these same elements are present in most other regions
15
7 Also witness the discussion on OCA in the context of the current EU enlargement round
covering  10  countries  in  central  and  Eastern  Europe  (e.g.  de  Grauwe  and  Askoy,  1999  or
Eichengreen and Ghironi 2001), as well as the Mercosur region about which more is said below.
8 Except perhaps for EMU, if only because the political motives were so compelling.of  the  world  where  a form  of  monetary  union  is  being  contemplated.  In
several regions of the world there are a varied set of forces pressing for
changes in the exchange rate regime. In North America and the Antipodes, as
we shall see below, there is a sense that while the downward drift in the
nominal exchange rate (vis-à-vis the US) persisted this was interpreted as
symptomatic of some underlying structural problem that can only be repaired
via currency unification.
9 Nevertheless, unlike several LAC countries, the
other potential candidates for monetary union discussed in this paper have
well-developed financial markets, and strong and well-functioning fiscal and
monetary institutions. We return to this issue below.
Hargreaves and McDermott (1999) find that acurrency union for New Zealand
might be desirable relative to merely ‘pegging’ its exchange rate. Yet, while
both regimes reduce macroeconomic flexibility, only the former produces
sufficient  (transactions)  cost  savings.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  while
countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Eurozone are
“independently  floating”,  at  least  according  to  IMF  definitions,  Latin
American countries have adopted exchange rate arrangements that fit into all
of the IMF classifications.
10As a result, Rojas-Suarez (2002) argues that trade
integration will be hampered and the risks of exiting a Free Trade Agreement
of the Americas (FTAA) will be greater. Orr (1999), in contrast, concludes that
the benefits of maintaining policy flexibility probably outweigh the benefits
from small gains in trade volumes, and from the reduction in transactions costs
that stem from a monetary union. The reason is that New Zealand is a small
open economy that is especially vulnerable to unexpected shocks from various
parts of the globe. Moreover, there is no evidence that the growth in trade has
been hampered by the adoption of floating rates, at least in the industrial world.
Grimes, Holmes and Bowden (2000), underline the microeconomic benefits
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9Arndt (2002) surveys the two sides of the debate over monetary integration in North America
with special emphasis on the evidence, or lack thereof, for the notion that nominal exchange rate
depreciation can precipitate a productivity slowdown with a consequent drop in the standard of
living. Interestingly, notions of a productivity deficit seem to have vanished during 2003 in the
three candidate countries listed in Table 1 in the wake of an extraordinarily rapid appreciation of
their respective currencies, especially vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.
10 Prior to the end of 2002, 8 countries had no separate legal tender, 1 country had a currency
board since demised, 13 countries had some kind of pegged currency (with/without bands or a type
of  crawling  peg),  4  countries  adopted  a managed  float,  and  6  had  independently  floating
currencies. An issue relevant to the main arguments in the present study, but one we do not touch
upon, is one’s definition of a pegged versus a floating exchange rate regime. Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2001) argue that conventional classifications of exchange rate regimes (e.g., IMF
definitions)  offer  an  inadequate  portrayal  of  the  actual  regime  in  place.  An  even  more
comprehensive revisionist view of exchange rate regime classifications is Reinhart and Rogoff
(2002) who conclude, for example, that freely floating exchange rate regimes deliver the best
inflation performance.for New Zealand in abandoning the NZD in favor of the AUD and rely on
survey evidence to justify some of their arguments. One element in the cost-
benefit  analysis  of  alternative  exchange  rate  arrangements  concerns  the
perceived costs of exchange rate volatility, and the concomitant costs of foreign
exchange intervention. Indeed, it is precisely these types of costs that have
produced the “fear of floating” view of exchange rate movements (e.g., see
Calvo and Reinhart 2000) in non-industrial countries. However, just as the
analysis of the impact of exchange rate volatility and the role of exchange rate
intervention needs to be conducted using data at very high frequencies for
industrial  economies,  the  same  argument  should  hold  for  developing,  or
emerging market economies, for which there are apaucity of studies. Wickham
(2002) is a recent exception. Using data for 16 countries, including Chile,
Mexico,  Colombia,  and  Peru,  he  finds  that  the  conditional  variance  of
exchange rates reacts more sharply to large shocks (e.g., the Asian financial
crises) than in the industrial countries that are used as the benchmark.
The  literature  suggests  that  at  least  four  elements  are  critical  to  the
establishment of an OCA in the presence of asymmetric shocksa. They are:
labor mobility: the free movement of labor smoothes regional disparities in
unemployment rates; capital mobility: savings and investment will seek out
the most profitable opportunities while barriers to capital movement prevent
this. Openness and regional interdependence: it makes sense to use the same
currency if goods move freely between the regions and if a significant portion
of  trade  is  done  within  a specific  region
11;  wage  and  price  flexibility:
resources can only be allocated to their best uses if wages and prices are
sufficiently flexible. Otherwise, the exchange rate must perform that function.
McKinnon (2001) points out that the foregoing list excludes an explicit role
for risk sharing, a largely neglected feature of the OCA literature raised by
Mundell in some lesser known articles where he effectively downplays the
role of asymmetric shocks as a determinant of OCA. Indeed, this feature may
be at the heart of the costs calculus associated with notions of “home bias” in
financial  asset  holdings  that  might  be  relieved  via  a common  currency
arrangement.  Bordo,  Eichengreen,  Klingebiel,  and  Martinez-Peria  (2001)
observe  that  a flexible  exchange  rate  regime  is  better  able  to  cope  with
a banking crisis.
12 Alesina and Barro (2002) also extend the existing criteria
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11 Lane (2001) is a recent survey of, among other issues examined, the connection between
openness, trade, and real exchange rate behavior.
12 Some of the countries considered here suffered from financial stresses or crises of some kind
over the sample period considered.to include a country’s historical experience with the level and volatility of
inflation, the degree of trade between candidate and target countries
13, the
amount  of  synchronicity  of  business  cycles,  and  the  stability  of  the  real
exchange  rate.  For  the  purposes  of  the  present  paper  we  omit  a direct
reference to these issues, in part because the relevant literature is still far from
reaching a consensus.
14
3.2 Varieties of Currency Unions
There exist a number of arrangements that aim to provide benefits similar to
a currency union at the cost of reduced policy flexibility. More relevant for
our purposes is the possibility that the candidate economies will either adopt
the target economy’s currency or an entirely new currency will be established.
The transition to EMU in 1999 corresponds to the latter position.
Dollarization  is  relevant  to  the  experience  of  all  candidate  countries
considered in this paper. It emerges in two forms. The first is private market
dollarization: private businesses transact their business in US dollars. For
example, a large number of business transactions in Canada are conducted in
USD. Nevertheless, conventional measures of dollarization, such as foreign
currency deposits to GDP, suggest that Canada is far less dollarized than
might  be  otherwise  believed  (Murray  and  Powell  2002).
15 This  does  not
require any involvement on the part of the Canadian Government, and is
a response of the marketplace. The second form of dollarization is policy
dollarization whereby the Canadian Government would officially sanction the
use of the USD either as a parallel currency or by unilateral dollarization.
Dollarization  functions  similarly  to  a fixed  exchange  rate.  However,  the
candidate economies would be giving up all seigniorage and the control of
monetary policy as in a currency board. For countries such as Argentina,
attempting to emerge from under severe currency crisis, such an option is
seriously being considered, at least at the political level though the proposal
has so far been ruled out, echoing the recommendations of the Report by
a Panel of Independent Advisers (Tietmeyer et. al. 2002).
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13 The authors use the “client” and “anchor” nomenclature instead of the candidate and target
terminology employed in this paper. There is, however, no essential difference between the two
sets of terms. 
14Also, in the case of Canada and the US, the home bias “puzzle” is complicated by the fact that
taxes and other microeconomic considerations come into play since the relatively free movement
of capital has long been a feature of the trading relationship between these two countries.
15 Dollarization is certainly far less intensive than it was in, say, Argentina.There is considerable disagreement about the pros and cons of dollarization.
Some argue that such a policy is a sensible option only in the most extreme
conditions such as persistent economic mismanagement (Buiter 1999). Others
are skeptical about the evidence that dollarization can cure a multitude of
economic ills (Eichengreen 2002a). The Journal of Policy Modeling (2001),
represents other recent surveys of the literature with special emphasis on
outstanding issues needing a firmer theoretical basis, and prospects of pitfalls
of such a policy for the Americas. At the risk of oversimplification, the crux of
the matter is that while dollarization would constrain inflation, such a policy
does not resolve deep-seated problems such as weak institutions. Moreover, it
is not at all clear that dollarization would completely prevent the possibility of
excessive indebtedness in future (Edwards 2002). It should be emphasized that
while dollarization remains an option, it is quite likely that countries that
choose this path will, in all likelihood, loose the flexibility – assuming, of
course, that such flexibility is desirable – of changing the exchange rate regime.
It is, in principle, difficult to reverse a dollarization policy.
Yet another possibility is the formation of a completely new (multilateral)
monetary union which is a far more complex and time-consuming process.
A formal  monetary  union  also  represents  a significant  constitutional  and
political change. The EU has spent decades harmonizing policy, and building
a solid  economic  union  while  a political  union  still  remains  elusive.  In
particular, such a monetary union represents the surrender of a significant
portion  of  national  sovereignty  to  a supranational  entity.  Thus,  monetary
integration is eminently a political process. Cohen (1993) is one study, among
many, that have stressed the primacy of political factors over economic ones.
16
If  earlier  monetary  unions  offer  any  insights,  the  monetary  union  in  the
United States was not complete until after political integration (Buiter 1999;
Rolnick,  Smith  and  Weber  1994).  Italy  and  Germany  are  examples  of
countries that achieved political integration prior to monetary integration.
Belgium and Luxembourg on the other hand formed a successful bilateral
monetary union from 1922 onwards until their absorption into EMU in 1999.
There have also been monetary unions that have been dissolved such as the
Irish currency board. Dissolution in this instance was made easier because
each  member  country  maintained  a central  bank  of  its  own  during  the
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16 Wyplosz (2001a, 2001b) essentially makes the same argument in reviewing the last half-
century or so of European macroeconomic history leading up to EMU. However, he emphasizes
that policy makers in Europe fundamentally believe that the gains from enhanced trade under
a single currency system far exceed any macroeconomic costs from the loss of policy flexibility
in EMU.monetary  union.  However,  in  the  case  of  political  divorce,  monetary
separation has always followed (Bordo and Jonung, 1999), such as in the case
of the break-up of Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union. Ironically, it is almost
always political and not economic developments that cause the break-up of
a monetary union. The important innovation in the context of EMU precisely
was monetary unification without political unification (Mundell 2000).
Feldstein (1997) points out that the desirability of EMU will be judged not by
its impact on inflation and unemployment but by its effect on peace and
conflict  within  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  Nevertheless,  Feldstein
(2001) believes strongly that the current EMU arrangements have insufficient
instrument  flexibility  to  cope  with  naturally  occurring  business  cycle
asymmetries within a monetary union (see below). Indeed, he stresses, as
have others (Calmfors 2000), that “… the reason that the EMU exists today
is political rather than economic.” Furthermore, it bears repeating again that
monetary unions of the past have generally followed as part of the process of
political unification
17. It has been political glue that holds a monetary union
together.
18 To take perhaps an extreme example, Soviet monetary history in
the 1919–24 period (Siklos 1999) represents a cautionary tale of the nexus
that links political union with monetary union. Rarely is one possible without
the  other.  The  Soviet  authorities  were  unable  to  project  their  political
authority until the many competing currencies that circulated throughout its
territory  were  withdrawn  form  circulation  (occasionally  forcibly).  It  is
important, however, to acknowledge (see below) that the long preparatory
stages  that  culminated  with  EMU  represents  a critical  and  distinguishing
characteristic of the novel European experiment.
3.3 The Role of Aggregate Shocks
In  what  follows,  we  focus  on  two  questions  surrounding  the  choice  of
monetary  arrangements,  namely  the  impact  of  economic  shocks  under
different exchange rate regimes and the influence of currency arrangements
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17 There  are  a few  notable  exceptions  where  there  are  nation  states,  which  do  not  have
a national  currency  unit  of  their  own,  like  Panama,  Monaco, Andorra,  San  Marino,  and  the
Vatican. Generally, these are very small countries. In this connection, see Rose (2001).
18 This suggests, for example, that Finland and Sweden, two obvious candidates for monetary
union (e.g., see Jonung and Sjöholm (1999), should both opt into EMU. At present, Finland
adopted the euro while Sweden, after the failed referendum in September 2003, is unlikely to
follow in the near to medium term.on  the  synchronicity  of  business  cycles.
19 To  conserve  space,  the  review
below is highly selective.
As indicated earlier, some of the conditions that support flexible rates include
structural  differences  between  the  candidate  and  target  countries.  For
example, Murray (2000) argues that, despite the highly integrated nature of,
for  example,  the  US  and  Canadian  economies,  important  structural
differences do remain. Canada is more exposed to external shocks than is the
US. Furthermore, there must be sufficient downward rigidity of wages and
prices. In the case of Canada the available wage and compensation data do not
suggest that the majority of private-sector firms faced a binding floor at zero
wage change in the 1990s.
Ultimately,  however,  the  principal  advantage  of  a flexible  exchange  rate
regime is its ability to absorb both foreign and domestic economic shocks
thereby  highlighting  the  role  of  monetary  sovereignty.  Therefore,  much
empirical  research  work  has  focused  on  whether  aggregate  shocks  are
symmetric or not.
It should be pointed out, however, that not all shocks are treated on the same
footing. Hence, while technological or productivity shocks are believed to
have permanent economic effects others, such as monetary, fiscal or exchange
rate  shocks  are  believed  to  have  only  a temporary  impact  on  levels  of
economic  activity.  Equally  important,  as  we  shall  see  below,  is  that
assumptions  about  the  permanence  of  shocks  are  intertwined  with  the
structure of the specified model. Hence, the degree of shock symmetry is
sensitive  to  specification  issues. An  additional  issue  that  has  returned  to
greater prominence only fairly recently concerns the volatility of shocks and
whether these produce additional detrimental economic effects.
20
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19 Typically, the shocks we have in mind are ordinarily of the aggregate demand or aggregate
supply variety. Clearly, other shocks, such as fiscal or banking system shocks will also have
repercussions for the choice of exchange rate regime. Taking account of these types of shocks
would require a survey of financial crises, and their onset, a rather large literature that is omitted
here due to space limitations. Readers are referred to several recent analyses or surveys such as
Chinn (2001).
20 Mussa  (1976)  remains  the  classic  reference  for  empirical  work  that  fails  to  find  any
deleterious effects from volatile exchange rates under a floating regime. Belke and Gros (2002)
present some empirical evidence to the effect that exchange rate and interest rate volatility have
reduced employment and increased unemployment in the LAC region and they blame the result
on the fact that, since investment is irreversible, exchange rate volatility has negative economic
effects. Current research on monetary policy rules finds that the volatility of inflation, output, and
the real exchange rate (in deviations from some notional level for these variables) represent the
loci of optimal policies. Shock symmetry refers to the distribution of the impact of some economic
shock across the participating economies in a potential monetary union. If
shocks  are  indeed  highly  asymmetric  –  read  uncorrelated  –  then  floating
exchange rates act as a shock absorber
21; otherwise, the exchange rate does
not  serve  a useful  corrective  role  and  so  the  various  micro  and  macro
economic  costs  of  national  currency  arrangements  become  critical.
Dupasquier,  Lalonde  and  St.-Amant  (1997)  address  the  exchange  rate
response issue – the fact that Canada’s exchange rate has tended to appreciate
in the wake of non-monetary demand shocks. They also find that the interest
rate  rises  following  such  a shock.  These  results  suggest  that  identified
non-monetary demand shocks correspond closely to real demand shocks and
that what we are seeing is the crowding out effect of these real shocks. They
also observe that, following a one standard deviation non-monetary shock, the
adjustment in the exchange rate is much swifter and greater than that of
prices. Moreover, the adjustment in prices is statistically insignificant, while
the impact of nominal exchange rates is statistically different from zero. From
this  perspective,  it  looks  costly  for  Canada  to  abandon  exchange  rate
flexibility. They  also  show  that  the  nominal  exchange  rate  contributes  to
facilitating macroeconomic adjustments, and that it does so mainly for real
demand shocks. 
Theoretical models do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the exchange
rate acts as an automatic adjustment device. Devereux (1999) points out that it
is crucial to consider whether prices are sticky in a flexible exchange rate
world, as well as the level of international monetary policy coordination.
22The
former limits the pass-through effects of exchange rate changes; the latter can
also impose external limits to the ability of domestic policies to react to
international economic shocks. An extension of existing theoretical models
leads to the conclusion that, in the presence of sticky prices and a cooperative
peg,  as  opposed  to  a unilateral  peg,  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime  may
welfare-dominate a floating regime.
23
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21 The shock absorbing qualities also depend on the intensity of second round effects following
exchange rate changes.
22Apure float obviates the need for any form of monetary policy coordination. However, other
exchange rate arrangements, as well as models (typically of the Keynesian variety), raise the
specter of policy coordination. Space limitations prevent a fuller discussion of the issues. See,
however, e.g., Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002). 
23 In a more recent paper (Devereux 2003), the flexible exchange rate model as the perfect
“shock absorber” is found to be inferior, in welfare terms, to a fixed exchange rate regime in the
presence of aggregate demand shocks, imperfect or incomplete financial markets, and the absence
of wage flexibility. As a result, consumption between domestic and foreign goods can be optimal
under a pegged regime. Flood  and  Rose  (1995), compare  the  volatility  of  different  major
macroeconomic variables under fixed and flexible exchange rates. As noted
earlier, a proper assessment of the net benefits of one region over another does
not stop at a comparison of levels of some set of macroeconomic aggregates.
Also, the frequency and size of shocks is likely to be related to the volatility
of  key  macroeconomic  aggregates.  They  find  that  there  is  no  significant
difference in the volatility of variables such as output and inflation. Flexible
exchange  rates  may  correspond  to  periods  of  greater  and  more  volatile
shocks, but their results support the hypothesis that exchange rate flexibility
has facilitated adjustment to real demand shocks as in, for example, Canada
over the last few years, and that without this flexibility, prices and domestic
output would have been more volatile. Moreover, it is possible that exchange
rate flexibility has attenuated the effects of certain shocks specific to the
Canadian economy, such as ones stemming from movements in commodity
prices.
In a model of VAR simulations of inflation and output growth, Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1994) attempt to measure the asymmetry of contemporaneous
shocks. They are able to identify permanent and transitory shocks using the
Blanchard-Quah decomposition method. For Canada and the US they find
that supply shocks are not highly correlated, while the degree of symmetry of
shocks  in  regions  within  the  US  is  notably  higher.  In  a slightly  more
sophisticated  study,  taking  into  account  the  degree  of  symmetry  of  both
demand  and  supply  shocks  affecting  Canada  and  the  US,  DeSerres  and
Lalonde (1994), use models (VARs) with three variables: the growth rates of
output, prices and money. They remove monetary shocks from other demand
shocks by imposing the restriction of long-term neutrality, that is, monetary
shocks  have  no  permanent  effect  on  real  balances.  They  examine
contemporaneous correlations of supply shocks and non-monetary demand
shocks, and conclude that shocks affecting the Canadian economy have little
in common with those that affect the US. Finally, DeSerres and Lalonde
(1994) find that Canada and the US are subject to significant asymmetric
shocks, whereas structural shocks hitting the nine regions of the US are very
similar. The reported correlations in the latter case range between 50–99%.
Therefore,  they  conclude  that  the  US  is  an  optimum  currency  area.
Hochreiter, Korinek and Siklos (2003) also use a structural VAR but permit
interaction between fiscal and monetary policy and find that the correlation of
shocks is lower than reported elsewhere in the literature, as in the study cited
above. They also point out that controlling for systematic policy can make
a great deal of difference to the size of correlations between structural shocks.
Such findings reflect a growing consensus at least among some economists
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more systematic components that also ought to be considered in assessing the
suitability of one monetary regime versus others.
The  likelihood  that  an  adverse  shock  would  have  a major  impact  on  an
economy  will  depend  on  the  structure  of  production,  both  actual  and
perceived. The  experiences  of  Canada  and  the Antipodes  are  particularly
relevant here for their own sake, but also for the LAC countries, since many
of them are perceived, rightly or wrongly, by foreign exchange markets as
being “commodity currencies” and, therefore, may be vulnerable to adverse
international shocks. Blundell-Wignall and Gregory (1990) argue that, in the
context of large commodity price fluctuations, macroeconomic stabilization
and price stability call for exchange rate flexibility. But, as in the case of
a negative  commodity  price  shock,  the  exchange  rate  will  react  through
exchange  rate  depreciation,  increasing  the  consumer  price  index  by  an
amount  proportional  to  the  share  of  imports  in  consumption,  thereby
exacerbating inflationary pressures.
Courchene and Harris (1999) suggest that, in the case of Canada and the US,
flexible exchange rates have not served their purpose in the face of a trend
where trade is predominately North/South (i.e., between the US and Canada)
instead of East/West (i.e., between the provinces). They state that we are
witnessing  the  creation  of  large  regional  trading  blocs,  which  favor  the
adoption  of  a common  currency.
24 Asymmetric  shocks  that  would  have
occurred are smaller if the potential union partner is a key bilateral trading
partner.  There  is  reason  to  believe  the  same  might  be  true  for  the
Australia-New Zealand case (e.g., see Scrimgeour 2001).
Currently, over 80% of Canada’s exports are destined for US markets. The
north-south trade is greater than the east-west trade now for Canada.
25 In
contrast, trade between New Zealand and Australia represents only 4.5% of
Australia’s GDP.
26 Murray (2000) and Laidler (1999) find flaws with the
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24 In part for this reason, Chriszt (2000) argues that Canada, Mexico, and the US are good
candidates for a monetary union. 
25 Grady and MacMillan (1998) found that between 1989 and 1997 Canadian exports to the
rest of the world rose from 26.1% to 40.2% of national income, while inter-provincial trade
declined from 22.7% to 19.7 % of national income. 
26 Hargeaves and McDermott (1999) say that even with this amount of trade they estimate
potential transaction cost savings of a currency union with Australia at about .13% of GDP per
year or roughly NZD 40 per person. Grimmond (1991) points out that exports from New Zealand
to Australia tend to be manufacturing goods, not raw materials.Courchene-Harris view. They call into question their interpretation of the
structure of the Canadian and US economies. For example, Canada is far
more  dependent  on  commodities.  The  connection  between  the  nominal
exchange  rate,  the  structure  and  productivity  of  an  economy  should  be
a secondary  concern  if  it  is  accepted  that  the  state  of  the  economic
environment follows from the choice of domestic policies (viz., monetary and
fiscal),  and  not  vice-versa. Yet,  it  is  precisely  this  reverse-causation  that
opponents to the floating regime in Canada referred to above have in mind
though the evidence for this view appears to be rather weak at best (also see
Arndt 2002).
There appears to be little public support in Canada for such integration. It is
also questionable how much support exists in the Antipodes, especially in
Australia (see, however, Grimes, Holmes and Bowden 2000), though there
have been attempts to create common currency arrangements in the past.
Indeed,  recent  re-examinations  of  the  potential  net  benefits  of  an
Australian-New Zealand monetary union (e.g., see Coleman 2001) suggest
that the case for net gains from trade under a common currency remain
unclear. Moreover, while the exchange rate does not appear to have done an
adequate job as a shock absorber, few believe that monetary union will take
place in the foreseeable future largely because of political obstacles that
stand  in  the  way  of  such  an  arrangement.  Moreover,  as  noted  earlier,
economic performance has continued to be good and the US recession of
2001–02  was  note  transmitted  to  either  of  these  countries.  In  contrast,
Austria and the Netherlands understood and, for the most part, welcomed
closer political and monetary integration with Germany and the other EU
member countries.
As noted earlier, there appears to be little taste for monetary integration with
the US in the LAC region for the reasons outlined above. Instead, monetary
union,  or  dollarization,  is  seen  as  providing  the  necessary  the  necessary
anchor that might permit the development of sound financial institutions and
a stable fiscal policy. It is not the exchange rate regime per se (see sections
2.1  above)  that  is  the  source  of  the  problem  but  the  weak  political  and
institutional structures that have led to poor economic performance. Indeed,
a notable feature of the three countries considered in Table 1 is that they have
each  adopted  inflation  targeting  and  this  represents  a coherent  monetary
policy strategy in the presence of floating exchange rates.
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So far, the analysis has focused on the role of monetary policy as the principal
means  of  macroeconomic  adjustment  in  the  presence  of  shocks  under
different exchange rate regimes. Yet, there is a crucial role for fiscal policy.
Grubel (1999) argues that the need for flexible exchange rates is overrated
and all that is required is internal price adjustment, a sound fiscal policy, and
internal migration. He cites the example of California and the closure of the
defense-related  companies  when  the  federal  government  decreased  its
defense spending in that state.
27 While Murray (2000) concedes that flexible
exchange rates could indeed be made redundant if the country has a surfeit of
macroeconomic instruments, this is rarely the case. Generous fiscal transfers
could be enacted when there are shocks to the economy, but they often lack
the speed necessary to be effective, and are difficult to reverse once the shock
has passed. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) conclude that there is no evidence of
a reliable link between exchange rate regimes and fiscal policy. Crow (1999)
argues that floating currencies do not allow fiscal policy to be irresponsible
on the grounds this irresponsibility is not floated off by depreciation. Grubel
(1999) argues that a common currency would have a positive impact on fiscal
discipline since there would be an external constraint on debt and deficit
spending. Nevertheless, Grubel assumes that Canada’s fiscal policy has been
unusually irresponsible but it is far from clear that this was the case. The
experience of the 1990s and the first years of the decade since the year 2000
put paid to that argument. Indeed, it is the US which is now viewed as being
fiscally irresponsible while Canada is the only G7 country with a continuing
fiscal surplus. Unlike Argentina (or New Zealand in the early 1980s), there
were never any suggestions that the country was about to hit a “debt wall”
with a consequent inability to cope with the demand for foreign exchange
under a rigidly pegged exchange rate regime.
28 Fear of a future devaluation is
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27 California had the benefit of US fiscal federalism, which entitled the State to financial aid
inflows from other States. Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1992) emphasize that currency unions such as
the United States have less of a need for monetary policy since this transfer system works for the
nine US regions. They estimated that over 1970-1988, a $1 decline in a region’s income led to a 33
to 37 cent fall in tax payments to Washington and a 1 to 8 cent increase in transfer receipts. Thus,
at least a third of a region’s economic bad luck is offset by this federal fiscal system. In Europe,
while there are hardly any transfers on a EU wide level (limit of taxation of 1.27% of EU wide
GDP), there exist large national fiscal safety nets.
28 As Mussa (2002) points out “bad luck”, in the form of a series of unexpected economic
shocks, also contributed to the Argentine tragedy. In addition, the survival of Argentina’s currency
board despite the Tequila crisis of 1994 , and the Asian crisis of 1997, further emboldened policy
makers to delay needed structural and fiscal reforms, as well as convincing foreign lenders that the
country was a good bet.generated by the consequences of lax fiscal policy today. By contrast, bad
fiscal policy is reflected more quickly in current exchange rate movements
under a floating regime. It is not immediately clear, a priori or even in theory,
why  one  regime  has  greater  net  benefits  than  another  in  terms  of  fiscal
discipline.
The importance of fiscal policy cannot be underemphasized in the case of
LAC countries. As the Argentine experience amply demonstrates, running
a budget deficit during years of strong growth, facilitated in part from the
drive  to  root  out  inflation  following  the  adoption  of  the  currency  board
approach, together with an international financial community all too willing
to provide foreign currency loans prior to assurances that fiscal and monetary
policies would operate harmoniously and for the foreseeable future, spelled
economic collapse when the overvalued peso’s exchange rate could no longer
be maintained (e.g., see Willett 2003).
29
The importance attached to the role of fiscal policy and debt management has
become  a mantra  among  economists  who  point  out  that  choosing  the
exchange rate regime is not enough. One must also have a coherent monetary
and fiscal strategy. This point is elegantly made by Begg (2002) who also
draws attention to the limitations of comparing the EU experience with the
potential for monetary integration in the LAC region. He does, however,
suggest that there are potential net benefits to relying on a supra-national
agency – he does not specify which kind – at both the monetary and fiscal
levels. Nevertheless, to date, the LAC countries have been “forced” to direct
their attention to organizations such as the IMF in an attempt to provide
a commitment mechanism when convenient or as the object of their fury
when an economic crisis erupts. An alternative, underlined by Hochreiter,
Schmidt-Hebbel and Winckler (2002) might be the long awaited Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Yet, unlike the EU experience where
Germany and France (as well as Italy and the UK to a large extent) act as
counterweights to each other in the formulation and execution of economic
policies there is the fear that, under an FTAA, the US will have excessive
influence over policy choices and outcomes.
30
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29 As noted above a currency board can be thought of as a type of fixed exchange rate system
supported by additional institutional constraints. For additional details the reader may wish to
consult, for example, Ho (2002).
30 Rojas-Suarez (2002) draws a parallel between the pre-conditions for a sustainable FTAAand
the maintenance of fixed exchange rates. Hence, it is far from clear under these circumstances how
such a trading bloc could be a panacea for all the economic ills facing the LAC region. 3.5. Comovements in Business Cycle Synchronicity
Increased synchronicity of business cycles is a relevant argument in support
of OCAs. Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that a currency union can lead to
increased  economic  integration  which  will  tend  to  synchronize  business
cycles.
31 However,  they  also  believe  that  international  trade  patterns  are
endogenous, and having a fixed exchange rate will lead trade relations to
become  more  intense  between  two  countries  (also,  see  Rose  and  van
Wyncoop 2001).
32This means that, as trade increases within a currency union,
the shocks the union partners face will become more symmetric over time.
33
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) conclude that the degree of asymmetry is
considerably  smaller  if  only  the  sub-set  of  EU  countries  that  have
traditionally maintained close economic and monetary links with Germany is
considered. On the other hand, Hochreiter and Winckler (1995) show that,
throughout  the  1970s and  1980s,  shocks  hit  the  Austrian  economy
asymmetrically vis-à-vis the German economy. Empirical evidence does not
support  the  view  that  shocks  have  become  more  symmetric  over  time.
34
Wyplosz (2001a) estimates a three variable VAR and open economy Taylor
type policy rules and finds that business cycles in Germany and France, in
particular, have become more synchronous. Hence, greater market integration
in  Europe  may  have  contributed  to  reducing  the  overall  heterogeneity  in
business cycle and monetary policies.
Also,  if  economic  integration  favors  national  specialization,  as  suggested
by Krugman  (1993),  countries  may  then  become  more  sensitive  to
industry-specific shocks, resulting in more idiosyncratic business cycles.
35 For
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31 However, there is evidence for New Zealand that suggests this may not be relevant since
fluctuations in the prices of commodity exports tend to be the important source of shocks for the
economy.  Since  commodity  trade  is  unlikely  to  be  greatly  affected  by  currency  union,  this
probably diminishes the opportunity for convergence of business cycles.
32 Pakko  and Wall  (2001)  question  the  methodology  employed  by  Rose  (2000),  as  does
Persson (2001) and suggest that the gains from trade in a currency union are considerably smaller
or possibly insignificant.
33 However,  recent  evidence  by  Ballabriga,  Sebastian,  and Valles  (1999),  shows  that  the
formation of a common currency area in Europe has not yet led to more synchronized business
cycles across Europe.
34 The authors do qualify this by stating that due to data problems, and limited statistical
significance, an earlier version of their paper had found increased symmetry of shocks in the
1980’s versus the 1970’s. 
35 Of course this effect can be offset if industry production is conducted on a cross-national
scale. Hence, components of certain goods might be produced in several countries so that it is not
clear that industry-specific shocks will only have national effects.example, in the case of Australia and New Zealand, since these two countries
likely face asymmetric shocks, they are unsuitable for forming a currency
union. Further exacerbating the problem is that New Zealand is also subject to
a number of idiosyncratic shocks (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994). Indeed,
in a series of counterfactual experiments that rely on the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand’s model, Drew, Hall, McDermott and St. Clair (2001) report that the
output gap would have been higher had New Zealand adopted the AUD.
36
However,  business  cycles  may  become  more  similar  if  demand  shocks
dominate, countries are subject to common external shocks, or intra-industry
trade dominates. As a consequence, a monetary union between Canada and the
US appears more costly from the point of view of shock asymmetry than from
the perspective of business cycle asymmetry. Apossible explanation is that the
US business cycle is quickly transmitted to Canada, due to the size of the US
economy  and  the  tight  economic  relationship  between  the  two  countries.
Hence, the two countries’business cycles are more correlated than previously
suggested. Exchange rate flexibility may also have made the two countries
business cycles more symmetric by smoothing the effect of asymmetric shocks
between the two countries.
Melitz  and  Weber  (1996)  point  out  that,  when  dynamics  are  taken  into
account, the US and Canadian economies exhibit a much greater degree of
symmetry. They find that the correlation between Canadian and US shocks is
not very different overall from what we observe for European countries. This
conclusion differs from the findings of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) or
DeSerres  and  Lalonde  (1994),  who  reported  a more  marked  symmetry
between European countries than between Canada and the US.
Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) show that, as the endogenous OCA argument
suggests, if firms change their pricing strategies, even if OCA criteria are not
satisfied ex post, monetary union can still produce a form of integration and
validate  the  choice  of  monetary  regimes.
37 Similarly,  choosing  a floating
regime over some alternative currency arrangement may also prove optimal
even  if  business  cycle  movements  between  the  candidate  and  target
economies are highly symmetric, again depending in part on the strength of
pass-through  effects  from  exchange  rates  to  prices.  Currency  areas  can,
therefore, be self-validating.
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36 Monetary policy would also have been looser thanks to a flatter yield curve inherited from
Australia.
37 In particular, the currency in which products for export are denominated becomes important.
We do not pursue this question any further. See, however, Bacchetta and van Wyncoop (2001).Throughout the foregoing discussion it is clear that a significant portion of the
current literature focuses on the experiences of industrial countries. First, and
foremost, there are considerable data related hurdles in constructing a usable
data  set  of  time  series  that  permit  the  type  of  sophisticated  econometric
testing reviewed above. Belke and Gros (2002) make this clear since both
their models and econometric evidence is narrowly focused on the connection
between  exchange  rate  and  interest  rate  volatility  and  employment  or
unemployment.    In  particular,  they  recognize  the  role  of  fiscal  policy  in
assessing the suitability for the Mercosur countries to form a monetary union
but are unable to meaningfully incorporate this feature in their empirical
exercise. No doubt it would have been useful to have more precise estimates
of the degree to which LAC countries are subject to asymmetric shocks.
Nevertheless, as the foregoing sections point out, there is ample aggregate
evidence to demonstrate that the combination of weak institutions, and still
more fragile politics, mean that the current time series evidence is not likely
to be sufficiently informative about this question. 
30 Crucial Aspects of Optimum Currency Areas: Selected Issues4.  Economic Distance: Selected Case Studies
38
In addition to calculating notional Maastricht convergence criteria it is useful
to consider a straightforward metric of the likely costs of monetary union in
the regions considered in this study. Alesina and Grilli (1992) present a simple
model to show that the costs of a monetary union depend on the volatility of
output  growth  between  the  candidate  and  target  countries,  to  use  our
nomenclature. This model begins by assuming a standard loss function for
society  (or  the  central  bank)  wherein  inflation  variability  and  output
variability  are  the  determinants.  Hence,  the  greater  are  the  differences
between the candidate and target countries’ output variances and the smaller
the correlation between candidate and target countries’ output growth, the
larger  the  potential  costs  of  forming  a monetary  union. As  a result,  the
combination of these two factors defines their notion of “economic distance”
as follows:
(1)
In equation (1), σ C is the standard deviation of output growth or inflation in
the  candidate  country;  σ T is  the  standard  deviation  of  output  growth  or
inflation in the target country; ρ i represent the simple correlation coefficient
of output growth or inflation between the candidate and target economies.
The measure of economic distance is defined in such a way so that the larger
the economic distance, the greater are thought to be the costs of monetary
union. Although  the  statistic  has  usually  been  applied  to  output  we  also
consider inflation since it is, of course, central to the strategy implicit in the
Maastricht Treaty. Figures 1 through 3 plot the relationship between the two
components of equation (1) for the various country groupings considered in
this paper. Data limitations restrict the number of sub-samples that can be
examined. For the three candidate countries examined in Table 1, we consider
two sub-samples for the following reasons. First, during the 1980s, monetary
union was far from certain in the European context, and little discussed in
either Canada or the Antipodes. Second, as there is considerable merit in the
argument  surrounding  endogenous  OCAs,  it  is  likely  that  European
economies especially will have adapted to the negotiations and, ultimately, to
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38 Some of the material below draws from Hochreiter and Siklos (2002).the  fulfilling  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  requirements.  Hence,  it  seems
appropriate to consider, as a benchmark, economic distance between Austria
or the Netherlands and Germany. The former countries were long thought to
be the ideal candidates for monetary union in Europe since at least the 1980s.
In Canada and the Antipodes, the introduction of inflation targeting (together
with the FTA for Canada and, later, NAFTA for Canada and Mexico) will
have also signaled a change in regime. For the Latin and North American
countries in the sample (Figures 2 and 3), we not only consider sub-sample
estimates but consider the possibility that either the US or Brazil represent the
target countries. Targeting the US would be consistent with, say, a policy of
dollarization,  an  oft-discussed  option,  while  targeting  Brazil  would  be
consistent with targeting a relatively large economy in a potential monetary
union involving the Mercosur countries.
Figure 1 reveals that the costs of monetary union have declined substantially
over the years for Australia and New Zealand. In the Canadian case, while
output growth correlations remain very high throughout the years considered,
output volatility has also grown considerably. Hence, the costs of forming
a monetary union with the US have, on balance, risen over time. Finally, in
the case of the European countries in our sample, these broadly reflect the
self-validating view of OCAs as reflected in the rise in the output growth
correlations and a relative fall in output growth volatility. The picture is more
mixed for the Netherlands with a fall in volatility offset by a sharp fall in
correlation.
Figure 2 assumes that the US is the target country. Output growth correlations
rise for Mexico, reflecting the impact of NAFTA and the float but output
volatilities remain markedly higher relative to the countries depicted in Figure
1. None of the countries appear to be a good fit for monetary union with the
US. The situation is somewhat better than if Brazil is the target country, as
shown  in  Figure  3.  Nevertheless,  for  the  most  recent  decade  of  data
(1991–2000), Paraguay is the best fit with Chile in second place. The costs of
forming a monetary union with the other countries appear rather high. 
The  measures  of  economic  distance  shown  in  Table  4  also  confirm  the
foregoing results. Economic distance in terms of output growth suggests that
the LAC countries are not generally good candidates yet for monetary union,
at least along these narrow lines. The evidence is considerably more favorable
in the case of inflation though one must be cautious as the 1990s cover an era
of sharp reductions in inflation throughout the world. It is far from clear
whether  these  are  permanent  but  the  data  do  suggest  that  inflation
32 Economic Distance: Selected Case Studiesconvergence  of  sorts  is  a feature  of  the  Mercosur  and  other  Latin  and
American  countries  considered  here.  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that
economic  distance  in  terms  of  inflation  between  Canada  and  the  US  is
relatively  high  a reflection  perhaps  of  the  manner  in  which  a floating
exchange rate regime has de-coupled relative inflation performance in the two
countries.
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The LAC region is not the only one contemplating monetary union. The
potential impact of proposals for adopting a common currency in parts of Asia
have  also  been  considered  (e.g.,  see  Wyplosz  2001a).  Finally,  several
European countries are to join the European Union in 2004. The European
Union Treaty requires the accession countries to adopt the euro once the
Maastricht convergence criteria are satisfied. Table 4 therefore also considers
economic distance for such candidate economies. In the case of the accession
countries, the euro area is the target while, for illustrative purposes, we use
Japan as the target country for the Asian economies considered.
While some accession countries, notable the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovenia,  are  good  candidates  for  monetary  union  in  terms  of  overall
economic performance, most are not. Indeed, they lag far behind many of the
candidate economies in a Mercosur type of monetary union. The results are
even  less  promising  when  one  examines  economic  distance  in  terms  of
inflation, though Hungary, Malta, and Slovenia are not more distant than is
Canada vis-à-vis the US.
Turning to the Asian bloc of countries, there is a smaller spread in economic
distance from Japan separating many candidate countries in terms of output
growth. The range is somewhat larger when examining economic distance in
terms of inflation with China, Hong Kong and Indonesia relatively distant
from Japan. 
Overall, it appears that business cycle synchronicity is fairly well established
for many countries among the groups considered as candidates for a monetary
union. There is a long road ahead, however, before economic distance in
inflation  is  conducive  to  monetary  union.  Clearly,  inflation  convergence
mechanisms of the kind specified in the European model of monetary union
appears to be critical in this regard.
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39 Over the sample considered in Table 1, Canada’s inflation rate has been consistently lower,
though more volatile, than in the US.5. Choosing and Exchange Rate Regime: Some
counterfactual Illustrations
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5.1. Model Specification and Econometric Considerations
Acritical question is, given a different set of unsystematic policies, would the
outcomes  for  inflation  and  output  have  been  different  in  the  candidate
economies  in  question  had  a different  monetary  regime  been  in  place?
Identification of systematic and unsystematic components of monetary and
fiscal policies is therefore important. The econometric requirements lead us,
however, to consider only the case of the candidate countries listed in Table 1,
as well as Austria and the Netherlands, since proper inference requires high
quality data at a reasonable frequency (i.e., at least quarterly) over a fairly
long time span.
In this section we focus on the role of the exchange rate regime and we
distinguish  between  a pegged  exchange  rate  with  no  currency  union,
thereby  permitting  different  interest  rate  policies,  a monetary  union  in
which the interest rate in candidate and target economies are identical, and
a floating  exchange  rate  where  exchange  rates  and  interest  rates  are
permitted to float but are constrained to satisfy the uncovered interest rate
parity (UIP) condition.
41 As an alternative to the UIP constraint we also
examine what would have happened if all candidate countries had adopted
a target for inflation while permitting the exchange rate to float freely. We
do so by “forcing” inflation to meet the specified inflation target.
42 In the
case of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, numerical inflation targets
were officially announced in the 1990s (cf. Siklos 2002 for the precise
dating).
35
40 This section draws on Hochreiter, Korinek, and Siklos (2003).
41 One could have instead imposed relative purchasing power parity. However, empirical
support for this hypothesis for a span of data of 30 years is rather weak. There is relatively stronger
evidence that UIP holds.
42 This counterfactual raises a number of difficult questions for, unless a central bank is
a “strict” inflation targeter (in the words of Svensson) then it would be preferable to force the
target to be met over a specified – but equally unobservable – target horizon. Although not entirely
satisfactory, we opted to model the inflation “forecast” as a smoothed series derived by applying
a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a large weight (4800) to actual inflation. However, for the sample
when  Australia,  Canada,  and  New  Zealand  actually  adopted  numerical  inflation  targets  the
relevant figures are used.Answering these questions requires that we formulate a structural model of
the economies under investigation. The technical details are relegated to an
appendix. 
Instead, below we provide a brief outline of the constructed model. The model
we  have  in  mind  estimates  the  structural  relationship  between  a set  of
monetary and non-monetary variables. The non-monetary variables consist of
real  GDP and  the  share  of  government  spending  to  GDP.  The  monetary
variables are the inflation rate in the CPI, short-term domestic and foreign
interest rates (in real terms using lagged realized inflation), and the rate of
change in the nominal exchange rate (vis-à-vis the US dollar).
Once  estimated,  we  use  the  model  to  extract  the  “shocks”  (i.e.,  the
unexplained variation) that are of interest, namely ones due to fiscal and
monetary policies, as well as ones originating from shocks originating from
the aggregate demand and supply sides. Other types of shocks can also be
identified and the reader is asked to consult the appendix for technical details.
In estimating such models we also condition on idiosyncratic shocks we have
identified from the historical record of each country under investigation. The
reason  is  that,  in  conducting  counterfactual  experiments,  we  wish  to
determine the sensitivity of our results to shocks which are unlikely to be
repeated in future.
Models are separately estimated for each country but where interdependence
between countries exists through the addition of the foreign interest rate (i.e.,
the US interest rate) to the relevant equations of the model. Finally, there are
important statistical reasons to worry about the form in which the time series
under investigation enter into any estimated model. In particular, results can
be  sensitive  according  to  whether  the  series  enter  in  levels  or  in  first
differences. The reason is that the series in question must be stationary. That
is, they must not exhibit any persistent tendency to rise or fall over time.
Next,  we  generate  forecasts  of  the  variables  in  the  model  by  imposing
hypothetical constraints on the model. They define the four counterfactual
scenarios we wish to consider: (1) a candidate country pegs its exchange rate
to that of the target country; (2) a full monetary union consisting of a fixed
exchange rate and adopting the nominal interest rate of the target country; (3)
adopting a floating exchange rate under the constraint that uncovered interest
parity holds in equilibrium. (4) Adopting a floating exchange rate regime,
where inflation is “forced” to meet the specified inflation target (π
*) every
period (see n. 11). 
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As noted previously, it is likely that the symmetry of shocks will be sensitive to
the treatment of the stationarity of the time series under investigation. As
a result, Tables 5 through 7 display two sets of correlations. Part (i) is based on
a SVAR where the series are in first differences but inflation and real interest
rate are assumed to be stationary. Part (ii) treats the real interest rate as being
difference stationary, while the remaining variables are unchanged in form
from  part  (i).  Finally,  we  provide  separate  estimates  of  the  correlation
coefficients  according  to  whether  unsystematic  components  of  economic
policies are taken into account. Details about the construction, justification, and
specification of the relevant dummy variables are relegated to an unpublished
appendix (available at www.wlu.ca/~wwwsbe/faculty/psiklos/home.htm). 
Generally, the results for the full sample (1970–2000; see Table 5) suggest
relatively small correlations across various types of shocks, regardless of how
the series are defined. It is apparent that the correlation of shocks is often
positive and higher between the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany than for
any other grouping of countries. Indeed, the correlations suggest that the least
amount of asymmetry occurs between the Austria and Germany pairing than
for any other grouping of countries. The one possible notable exception is the
set  of  correlations  for  the  Canada-US  case  though  the  results  are  highly
sensitive  to  the  specification  of  the  SVAR.  Indeed,  there  are  sometimes
striking  differences  depending  on  whether  stationarity  is  achieved  via
differencing of the real interest rate or when estimates are conditioned on the
unsystematic shocks. In particular, it is interesting to note that the smallest
correlations are often between the aggregate supply shocks experienced by
these country groupings. This result essentially suggests that, in some cases,
the  least  amount  of  asymmetry  emanates  from  aggregate  demand  or
non-monetary shocks. 
The  correlations  of  supply  and  monetary  shocks  appear  to  be  the  most
sensitive of all to the time series specification of the real interest rate series.
However, if we assume that first differencing is adequate, and this is generally
viewed  as  the  transformation  of  choice,  then  the  correlation  of  structural
shocks is rather modest though most significant in the Austria-Germany and
Netherlands-Germany pairings. Also, note that the correlation of monetary
shocks is generally positive and significant with the exception of a couple of
cases for the Canada-US pairing and one case for the New Zealand-Australia
group.
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Choosing and Exchange Rate Regime: Some counterfactual Illustrations 37Part (B) of the Table allows us to determine whether conditioning the results
on unsystematic policies has a significant impact on the results. If we examine
the case where inflation and the real interest rate are stationary, we find that
ignoring the unsystematic component of economic policies often leads to
a downward bias in estimates of the correlation of aggregate supply shocks
for Canada-US and NZ-Australia while the opposite is true for the monetary
shocks between Germany and Austria or the Netherlands. This is generally
also true when the real interest rate is assumed to be difference stationary.
Nevertheless, and this is especially apparent for the Austria-Germany and
Netherlands-Germany pairings, shocks are more highly correlated when the
control dummies (i.e. these capture idiosyncratic shocks) are included. Hence,
conditioning on unsystematic policies can have a significant result on the
degree of shock asymmetry estimated from the data. 
It is also interesting to examine the impact of our results for a couple of
sub-samples. We first consider a sample that excludes the 1990s. The last
decade is thought to be a historically unusual one because of the popularity of
inflation  control  objectives  and  the  relative  absence  of  aggregate  supply
shocks. Next, we estimate for the 1990s period alone. The results are shown
in  Tables  6  and  7.  Aggregate  supply  shocks  and  monetary  shocks  are
ordinarily less highly correlated for the 1990s when unsystematic shocks are
not controlled for. When estimates are conditioned on these shocks the impact
is  country  group  specific.  For  example,  aggregate  supply  shocks  and
monetary shocks become less highly correlated for the Netherlands-Germany
or Austria-Germany pairings while the opposite holds for the Canada-US and
NZ-Australia parings. Note, however, that this result is again sensitive to the
time series treatment of the real interest rate series. Non-monetary aggregate
demand shocks are also lower in the 1970–1989 sample in most cases. Given
that the 1970–1989 sample contains the period of high inflation and much
of the subsequent disinflation, it is probably reasonable to suggest that the
correlation of monetary policy shocks has fallen during the 1990s, despite the
growing convergence in monetary policies among the industrial countries,
if we are not prepared to condition our estimates on unsystematic shocks.
In other  words,  despite  seemingly  similar  monetary  policies  there  are
sufficient differences (perhaps in the timing of monetary policy actions?) and
that these are reflected in lower correlations in monetary shocks. Once we
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43 We also consider, but do not go into details here, the possibility of pairings between either
New Zealand or Australia and the US. There is greatest symmetry of shocks between Australia and
the US while the correlation of aggregate supply and demand shocks between New Zealand and
the US are negligible.control for unsystematic shocks the picture is less clear regarding differences
between the 1970s and 1980s versus the 1990s. Note also that, in almost half
of the cases considered, shocks that were positive in the 1970–1989 sample
turn negative in the most recent sub-sample. Finally, we consider the impact
of adding commodity prices as an exogenous variable for the Canada-US and
NZ-Australia groupings. Interestingly, this addition generally increases the
correlation of all Canada-US shocks while only aggregate supply shocks are
positively affected in the NZ-Australia case.
Overall, the degree of shock symmetry is not as high as other estimates based
on simpler models have shown. In any event, they certainly do not lend
support to any firm conclusions concerning the appropriateness of a chosen
monetary regime. In addition, there is considerable evidence that, despite the
maintenance of more or less the same exchange rate regimes over the three
decades examined, there are noticeable changes in the correlations among
different  types  of  economic  shocks.  Given  the  wide  diversity  of  models,
restrictions, and variable transformations considered in the literature, this is
reassuring in the sense that choosing “fixed” versus “flexible” exchange rates
does not tell the whole story about economic performance. Controlling for
unsystematic shocks has a measurable impact on the correlation of major
economic shocks suggesting that this is potentially an important element in
understanding economic fluctuations in the countries considered beyond the
type of exchange rate regime in place. 
Figures 4 through 7 consider the impulse responses. Only the ones for the
candidate countries are shown to conserve space. These impulse responses are
akin to multipliers often used in economic analysis. In other words, they
measure how a shock in some variable of interest (e.g., an aggregate supply
shock) affects the other variables in the model in subsequent periods. To
facilitate  their  interpretation  the  plots  show  the  accumulated  response  to
various shock combinations. Although there are a large number of results we
highlight the main features. Moreover, we restrict our attention to the full
sample  estimates  despite  likely  sub-sample  differences  because,  as  the
discussion above makes clear, there is no obvious delineation between the
various decades considered. Also, the span of the data is considerably longer
for  the  1970–2000  period  which,  given  the  size  and  complexity  of  the
restrictions imposed, is likely to yield more useful results.
For Austria, shown in Figure 4, it is notable that monetary and exchange rate
shocks have a quantitatively small or neutral impact on output. On the other
hand, aggregate supply shocks have a permanent effect on all the variables in
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Not surprisingly, monetary shocks have a permanent impact especially on
inflation. The results are broadly similar for the Netherlands, as shown in
Figure  5.  However,  aggregate  supply  shocks  have  a declining  impact  on
inflation  over  time  unlike  the  experience  for  Austria.  More  importantly,
perhaps, the cumulated exchange rate and interest rate response to a monetary
shock  is,  respectively,  permanent  and  temporary  in  the  case  of  the
Netherlands whereas the same shocks have relatively less impact for Austria.
Turning to the case of Germany (not shown), there are only a few differences
in the impulse responses relative to the candidate countries considered for an
alternative  monetary  arrangement.  Fiscal,  (non-monetary)  demand,  and
monetary shocks have a non-permanent effect on German output growth. This
is usually not the case for the Netherlands, for example while the results for
Austria  broadly  parallel  those  for  Germany.  However,  unlike Austria  for
example,  monetary  shocks  in  Germany  have  a permanent  impact  on  the
exchange rate and the interest rate.
If we consider now a comparison between Canada (Figure 6) and the US (not
shown) a few features are worth emphasizing. First, exchange rate shocks,
while persistent, have only temporary effects on the other variables in the
system for Canada. For the US, the impact is generally of a more permanent
nature. However, while a fiscal shock is seen to have a permanent effect on
Canada’s inflation rate, the same is not true for the US. In addition, a fiscal
shock has a positive but diminishing impact on output growth in Canada the
impact is negative in the US and begins to decline after about 20 quarters. The
same interpretation applies to the impact of an aggregate supply shock on
interest rates in Canada versus the US. That is, the impact of a supply shocks
is negative and rising for Canada and positive, but stable after 20 quarters for
the US. Moreover, while aggregate supply shocks permanently reduce US
inflation, there is no long-run impact on Canadian inflation. Perhaps this is
because such shocks have a permanent impact on US real interest rates while
Canadian real interest rates fall in the face of aggregate supply shocks. 
Finally, Figure 7 considers the case for New Zealand (Australia is not shown).
Of all the country groupings considered, the similarity of responses to various
shocks  is,  surprisingly  perhaps,  the  greatest  among  all  the  country  pairs
considered. Nevertheless, there are differences between the two countries, as
well as one notable difference between New Zealand, Australia and the other
countries considered here. First, a comparison between New Zealand and
Australia reveals that monetary shocks have a permanent impact on fiscal
policy in Australia while the impact is transitory in the New Zealand case.
40 Choosing and Exchange Rate Regime: Some counterfactual IllustrationsFinally, it is also worth noting that, for New Zealand, exchange rate shocks
have a temporary impact on domestic inflation, and a positive but diminishing
effect in the case of Australia. This is unlike the experience of most of the
other countries considered save perhaps Germany.
5.3. Counterfactual Experiments
Once  again,  as  there  are  a large  number  of  results,  we  have  chosen  to
summarize them in a series of figures. Figures 8 to 10 plot separately for
inflation, output growth, and the real interest rate, the range of estimates
obtained under the various experiments carried out, shown as vertical lines in
the figures, together with the mean “forecast” obtained from the model with
the impact of the unsystematic shocks described earlier, also removed, shown
as a horizontal line. Separate estimates for the full sample, as well as the
sub-samples described earlier, were also carried out. These are also shown in
the  various  figures.  As  the  additional  restrictions  imposed  to  obtain  the
estimates based on the various counterfactuals were previously discussed we
need not do so here. As for removing the impact of unsystematic shocks we
are of two minds. Since there is no reason to believe that past unsystematic
shocks will be reproduced in the future in exactly the same way as in the past,
as a comparison of the 1970s and 1980s versus the 1990s demonstrates, these
effects  should  be  removed  when  conducting  inferences  based  on  the
counterfactuals. On the other hand, it is highly likely that some unsystematic
shocks will appear in the future. On balance, however, we believe that the
chosen approach is likely to be more “realistic” for our purposes.
We begin with inflation (Figure 8). With the exception of the 1970–1989 sample
for  Canada  and  New  Zealand,  the  inflation  rate  based  on  the  various
counterfactual experiments encompass the forecast generated from the model
using actual data. Moreover, no clear winner emerges from the various regimes
considered across samples and country groupings. Nevertheless, it appears that
monetary union or a floating regime with UIP would have produced lower
inflation for Canada in the 1970sand 1980swhile it is unclear whether monetary
union with the US would have resulted in better inflation performance in the
1990s as the results are sensitive to the chosen specification. It is interesting to
note that inflation in the Netherlands would have generally been higher under
a float with UIPbut lower under the same conditions for Austria. 
Figure 9 displays the estimates for output growth. For Canada, an inflation
targeting regime would have produced higher output growth had it been in place
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necessarily  have  delivered  better  inflation  performance  in  the  most  recent
decade. In the case of New Zealand, monetary union with Australia throughout
the full sample or the 1990s would have led to higher than actual output growth
while a floating regime during the decade of the 1970s and 1980s would have
led to considerably lower output growth performance. There is little difference
between the existing exchange rate regime’s impact on output growth and
inflation targeting for Austria in either the full sample or the 1970–1989 period.
In the case of the Netherlands inflation targeting in the full sample would have
boosted output growth a little while a floating regime would have delivered
better economic performance during the decade of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Figure 10 compares real interest rate estimates under the various scenarios
considered. A pegged exchange rate would have led to generally higher real
interest rates in Canada while a float under UIP conditions or monetary union
during the 1990s would have resulted in lower real interest rates for New
Zealand. In the case of Austria and the Netherlands, an inflation targeting
regime would almost always have led to marginally lower real interest rates
in both countries while a float vis-à-vis Germany, under conditions of UIP,
would have produced higher than actual real interest rates.
Finally, we turn to the relationship between the variance and inflation and
output growth and the real interest rate (plots not shown). These are meant to
provide some idea of the trade-offs between the key variables that appear in
the so-called new trade-offs and can serve as a guide of “good conduct” in
a monetary regime. An indicator of the success of a particular regime should
be negatively correlated with the variance of inflation, output growth or real
interest rates. For the most part and inflation targeting regime would have
delivered  a better  output-inflation  volatility  trade-off  than  the  actual  data
while a pegged exchange rate system would have produced the least favorable
trade-off. The picture is somewhat less clear as far as the volatility of real
interest  rates  since  the  results  are  clearly  sample  sensitive.  Hence,  if  the
1990s alone are considered a monetary union would have led to a superior
inflation-real interest rate trade-off while estimates for the 1970–1989 would
have  placed  an  inflation  targeting  regime  ahead  of  the  other  scenarios
considered.  Turning  to  the  case  of  New  Zealand  we  find  that  the  least
favorable  inflation-output  volatility  trade-off  takes  place  under  a floating
regime  with  UIP.  Interestingly,  the  most  favorable  trade-offs  are  in  an
inflation targeting environment, except when the 1990s are considered in
which case monetary union with Australia would have delivered a relatively
superior inflation-output volatility combination. 
42 Choosing and Exchange Rate Regime: Some counterfactual IllustrationsThere is rather more clarity regarding the choice of monetary regimes for
Austria and the Netherlands. For Austria, inflation targeting produces the
most favorable output or real interest rate versus inflation volatility over all
samples.  In  contrast,  the  least  favorable  trade-off  takes  place  under  the
floating with UIP condition. Finally, in the case of the Netherlands the results
also  seem  clear-cut.  Inflation  targeting  may  yield  relatively  higher  real
interest  rate  volatility  but  produces  the  most  favorable  inflation-output
trade-offs. By contrast, monetary union results in the least amount of real
interest rate volatility given the level of inflation variability while a floating
regime with UIP produces the worse inflation-output variance trade-offs.
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In this paper we analyze the feasibility of regional currency unions outside
Europe by looking at specific aspects of the Optimum Currency Area approach,
measuring economic distance and by conducting a series of counterfactual
experiments. Because of Europe’s forerunner role we use the “Maastricht
Model” as a benchmark for potential currency unions in the Americas and the
Antipodes. The impending enlargement of the European Union by 10 countries
with the specific requirement for these countries to adopt the euro prompted us
to also include selected accession countries from central and eastern Europe in
our study. We believe that this specific European approach (while not without
significant risks) may offer insights for regional currency unions elsewhere
because its architecture combines a centralized monetary policy with only
loosely coordinated national fiscal policies. Such a currency union thus does
not depend on political unification, at least initially.
We first selectively review the OCA literature focusing on the roles of the
exchange rate regime to counter economic shocks and its influence on business
cycle  synchronicity  as  well  as  on  the  importance  of  fiscal  policy  as  an
adjustment tool. The empirical evidence points to a greater degree of business
cycle  synchronicity  in  Europe  (including  the  majority  of  the  accession
countries) than in the Americas. In general, weak fiscal policy and institutions,
such as in LAC, provide an argument against entering a monetary union.
The potential cost of a monetary union may also be assessed by measuring the
economic distance, calculated comparing the volatility of output growth and of
inflation between the candidate country and the target country. The results
suggest that business cycle synchronicity within the regions of our study can
vary widely. This result points to a relatively low cost of joining or forming
a monetary union on this score, at least for some of the countries considered.
Interestingly, some of the accession countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Poland)
are economically quite distant to the euro area. We also find that the costs of
monetary union have declined over time for Australia and New Zealand but the
political costs dwarf these at the present time so such a step seems highly
unlikely in the near future.
In another look at the issue of shock symmetry we estimate a structural model
that allows not only for the interdependence of shocks but also permits an
explicit role for fiscal policy. The evidence suggests and qualifies the results
45achieved  above  but  this  is  to  be  expected,  as  statistical  models  can  only
capture a reality that is as good as the specification put forward. We find that
the degree of shock symmetry in some of the regions perhaps is not as great
as one might expect. Thus, for example, if Canada and New Zealand were to
give up an autonomous monetary policy, some shocks would be substantially
different  under  a monetary  union  or  a hard  peg.  Even  Austria  and  the
Netherlands, both of which have chosen full monetary union face asymmetric
shocks.
In addition we perform – quite speculative – counterfactual experiments by
investigating the impact of alternative monetary regimes on the volatility of
inflation and economic growth. Ultimately, we find that economic integration
can be as much a feature of floating regimes as the interdependence that is
generated via a pegged exchange rate arrangement. If this is true, then the
core  differences  that  matter  in  deciding  which  monetary  regime  is  more
appropriate  for  some  countries  but  not  others  are,  ultimately,  political  or
institutional. This reminds us of the fundamental importance of the political
dimension of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe.
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COUNTRY INFLATION FISCAL 1 FISCAL 2 INTEREST
YEAR (CPI) (DEFICIT) (DEBT) RATE
% p.a. % of GDP % of GDP in %
Australia
1998 0.9 0.6 33.0 5.5
1999 1.5 1.0 26.1 6.1
2000 4.5 –0.2 26.6 6.3
New Zealand
1998 1.3 1.4 38.6 6.3
1999 0.1 0.3 37.1 6.4
2000 2.6 0.5 34.7 6.9
Canada
1998 0.9 0.5/1.0 116.2/64.9 4.89
1999 1.7 1.6/0.8 111.6/61.0 6.18
2000 2.7 3.2/1.8 104.9/51.8 5.35
Euro area
1998 1.7 (0.7) –2.3 73.2 4.8 (4.8)
1999 1.5 (0.6) –1.3 72.1  4.7 (4.8)
2000 2.8 (1.2) –0.9 69.6  5.4 (5.4)
44 Protocol 6 of the “Maastricht Treaty” contains the convergence criteria.
(1) Inflation criterion: an inflation rate not more than 1
1/2 % higher than those of the three
best performing EU countries over the latest 12 months).
(2) Fiscal convergence criteria: These criteria restrict the government budget deficit and the
government debt to certain levels. A country which wants to participate in the EMU may
not have 
– a government budget deficit higher than 3 % of GDP,
– a government debt ratio of more than 60 % of GDPor sufficiently fast approaching that
level.
(3) Interest rate criterion: an average nominal long term interest rate that does not exceed
by more than two percentage points that of the three best performing member states in
terms of price stability.
(4) Exchange rate criterion: participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the
European Monetary System (EMS) within the normal fluctuation margin without severe
tensions for at least two years.
Table 1. The Maastricht Model: The Euro area and selected candidate regions
441999: Austria (0.5%), France (0.6%), Germany (0.6%); average: 0.6%
2000: UK (0.8%), Sweden (1.3%), Germany (1.4%); average: 1.2%
Deficit: For the Euro area from ECB Monthly Bulletin (Table 7). For Australia and New Zealand from
OECD Economic Outlook, Annex Table 30. For Canada from Bank of Canada Banking and
Financial Statistics, Table A2.
Debt: For the euro area from ECB Monthly Bulletin. For Australia from OECD Economic Outlook,
Annex Table 34, for New Zealand: Source from IMF Staff Country Report No. 2000/139, Table
12 (these terms refer to fiscal years). For Canada from www.fin.gc.ca.
Interest Rate: OECD Economic Outlook, Annex Table 38. Average interest rate of euro area and
average interest rate of the three best performing EU-countries with regard to the inflation rate in
parenthesis. Terms refer to 10-year government bond yields. For Canada from Bank of Canada
Banking and Financial Statistics Table A2. 
1998: Sweden (5.0%), France (4.7%), Austria (4.7%); average: 4.8%
1999: Sweden (5.0%), France (4.6%), Austria (4.7%); average: 4.8%
2000: Sweden (5.4%), France (5.4%), Germany (5.3%); average: 5.4%.
53Notes: 
1. Mercosur consists of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
2. Annual rate of change
3. Money market rate, except for Chile (discount rate) and Mexico (Bankers’Acceptances).
4. The figures represent the mean CPI inflation and short-term interest rates with standard deviations
(across countries) in parenthesis. 
5. Most recent year for which there were comparable data.
6. Signifies that data comparable across countries were unavailable.
Sources: International  Financial  Statistics,  individual  country  central  banks,  Government  Financial
Statistics (International Monetary Fund). See Table 1 for criteria definitions and euro area data.
Data for FISCAL 2 for Argentina are from Mussa (2002).
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COUNTRY OR  INFLATION
2 FISCAL 1 FISCAL 2 INTEREST
COUNTRY (CPI) (DEFICIT) (DEBT) RATE
3




4 –2.1 41.3 19.4(9.4)
4
1999 4.0(3.6) –4.2 47.4 16.1(8.0)
2000 5.0(4.3) –3.6 50.6 12.8(4.2)
Brazil 1992 –4.4 (1992)
5 NA
6
1993 –0.3 (1993) NA
1994 –0.6 (1994) NA
Paraguay 1991 –6.40 12.1
1992 –33.6 13.3
1993 –2.6 12.8
Uruguay 1998 –0.8 23.6 (92)
1999 –3.7 21.9 (93)
2000 –3.4 24.5 (94)
Chile 1998 5.1 0.4 12.7 9.1
1999 3.3 –1.5 13.9 7.4
2000 3.8 0.1 13.9 8.7
Mexico 1998 15.93 –1.4 27.9 26.9
1999 16.6 –1.5 25.6 24.1
2000 9.5 –1.3 23.2 17.0
Pro memoria. 
Euro area
1998 1.7 (0.7) –2.3 73.2 4.8 (4.8)
1999 1.5 (0.6) –1.3 72.1  4.7 (4.8)









Table 2. Maastricht Criteria for Latin AmericaSources: EUROSTAT, national central banks.
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COUNTRY INFLATION FISCAL 1 FISCAL 2 INTEREST
YEAR (CPI) (DEFICIT) (DEBT
45)R A T E
46
% p.a. % of GDP % of GDP in %
Hungary
1998 14.2 –8.0 61.9 n.a.
1999 10.0 –5.6 61.0 9.9
2000 10.0 –3.0 55.4 8.6
Czech Republic
1998 9.7 –4.5 13.7 12.0
47
1999 1.8 –3.7 14.5 8.5
52
2000 3.9 –4.0 17.0 7.1
Poland
1998 11.8 –2.3 41.6 n.a.
1999 7.2 –1.5 42.7 9.6
2000 10.1 –1.8 38.7 11.9
Slovakia
1998 6.7 –4.7 25.1 12.4
48
1999 10.4 –6.4 26.4 11.4
53
2000 12.2 –10.4 27.6 8.3
Lithuania
1998 5 –3.1 17.1 6.8
49
1999 0.7 –5.7 23.0 8.2
54
2000 0.9 –2.6 24.0 9.6
7
Latvia
1998 4.3 –0.7 10.6
1999 2.1 –5.3 13.7 7.7
50




1998 1.7 (0.7) –2.3 73.2 4.8 (4.8)
1999 1.5 (0.6) –1.3 72.1  4.7 (4.8)
2000 2.8 (1.2) –0.9 69.6  5.4 (5.4)
Table 3. Maastricht Criteria for Selected central and eastern European Countries
45 general government debt
46 10 year government bond benchmark rate unless otherwise indicated.
47 annual average interest rates on loans over 4 years
48 average annual interest rates on long-term loans
49 average annual interest rates on loans over 5 years
50 weighted annual average long-term interest rateNote: Economic distance is as defined in Alesina and Grilli (1992) and equation (1). Annual data were
used. See Figures 1 to 3 for sources of data and Tables 1–3.
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Candidate (Target) Output Growth Inflation
New Zealand (Australia) 1.62 .71
Canada (US) 1.11 2.04
Austria (Germany) .59 .83
Netherlands (Germany) 1.20 .81
Argentina (Brazil) 2.50 .34
Paraguay (Brazil) .86 .10
Uruguay (Brazil) 1.97 .23
Chile (Brazil) 1.88 .11
Mexico (US) 2.63 12.59
Cyprus (euro area) 2.44 2.71
Czech R (euro area) 1.16 5.96
Estonia (euro area) 3.04 5.24
Hungary (euro area) 0.73 2.29
Latvia (euro area) 1.86 4.57
Lithuania (euro area) 3.41 6.01
Malta (euro area) 2.46 2.01
Poland (euro area) 8.21 6.33
Slovakia (euro area) 1.90 4.20
Slovenia (euro area) 1.16 2.13
China (Japan) 2.03 5.92
Hong Kong (Japan) 2.73 4.13
Indonesia (Japan) 4.70 9.96
Korea (Japan) 3.38 1.78
Malaysia (Japan) 4.07 0.86
Philippines (Japan) 1.80 2.85
Singapore (Japan) 3.25 1.69
Thailand (Japan) 4.29 2.58
Table 4. Economic Distance, 1991–200157
Candidate-Target Sources of shocks
Countries
Supply Demand  Monetary
(non-monetary)
(i) Inflation, ∆ g and r stationary
1
Canada-US –0.15 –0.03 0.11
NZ-Australia –0.07 –0.02 0.12
Netherlands-Germany 0.21 0.27 0.05
Austria-Germany –0.04 0.18 0.22
(ii) Inflation is stationary, g and r are difference stationary
2
Canada-US 0.15 0.47 –0.03
NZ-Australia –0.09 0.09 0.04
Netherlands-Germany 0.14 0.18 0.04
Austria-Germany 0.18 0.17 0.17
Candidate-Target Sources of shocks
Countries
Supply Demand  Monetary
(non-monetary)
(i) Inflation, ∆ g and r stationary
Canada-US 0.05 –0.03 0.06
NZ-Australia –0.10 –0.11 0.05
Netherlands-Germany 0.19 0.22 0.11
Austria-Germany 0.12 0.13 0.33
(ii) Inflation is stationary, g and r are difference stationary
Canada-US 0.14 0.29 –0.09
NZ-Australia –0.13 –0.004 –0.07
Netherlands-Germany 0.21 0.18 0.10
Austria-Germany 0.20 0.20 0.26
Table 5. Correlation of Structural Shocks, 1970–2000
(A) Ignoring Unsystematic Shocks
B) Conditional on Unsystematic Shocks
Notes:
1.  All other series are first difference stationary. See text for details.
2.  All other series are first difference stationary.58
Candidate-Target Sources of shocks
Countries
Supply Demand  Monetary
(non-monetary)
(i) Inflation, ∆ g and r stationary
Canada-US –0.30 –0.26 0.19
NZ-Australia –0.28 –0.08 0.13
Netherlands-Germany 0.15 –0.10 0.08
Austria-Germany –0.11 0.13 0.35
(ii) Inflation is stationary, g and r are difference stationary –0.26
Canada-US 0.19 0.29 0.17
NZ-Australia –0.23 0.06 0.10
Netherlands-Germany 0.02 0.06 –0.09
Austria-Germany 0.08 0.10 0.26
Candidate-Target Sources of shocks
Countries
Supply Demand  Monetary
(non-monetary)
(i) Inflation, ∆ g and r stationary
Canada-US –0.16 0.10 0.13
NZ-Australia –0.18 0.14 0.10
Netherlands-Germany 0.25 0.14 0.04
Austria-Germany 0.12 0.13 0.45
(ii) Inflation is stationary, g and r are difference stationary
Canada-US 0.15 0.10 0.02
NZ-Australia –0.28 –0.14 0.03
Netherlands-Germany 0.11 0.19 0.00
Austria-Germany 0.16 0.15 0.35
Table 6. Correlation of Structural Shocks, 1970–1989
(A) Ignoring Unsystematic Shocks
B) Conditional on Unsystematic Shocks59
Candidate-Target Sources of shocks
Countries
Supply Demand  Monetary
(non-monetary)
(i) Inflation, ∆ g and r stationary
Canada-US –0.15 0.15 –0.06
Canada-US
# –0.07 0.25 –0.15
NZ-Australia –0.06 0.33 0.17
NZ-Australia –0.15 0.24 –0.02
Netherlands-Germany 0.19 –0.10 0.03
Austria-Germany –0.06 0.09 0.22
(ii) Inflation is stationary, g and r are difference stationary –0.14
Canada-US –0.06 0.10 –0.13
Canada-US –0.05 0.14 –0.16
NZ-Australia –0.22 –0.04 0.09
NZ-Australia –0.27 –0.11 0.08
Netherlands-Germany –0.08 –0.08 –0.08
Austria-Germany –0.24 0.21 –0.02
Candidate-Target Sources of shocks
Countries
Supply Demand  Monetary
(non-monetary)
(i) Inflation, ∆ g and r stationary
Canada-US 0.08 0.22 0.04
Canada-US 0.14 0.30 0.21
NZ-Australia –0.06 0.33 0.17
NZ-Australia –0.15 0.24 –0.02
Netherlands-Germany 0.09 –0.05 0.04
Austria-Germany 0.18 0.07 0.09
(ii) Inflation is stationary, g and r are difference stationary
Canada-US 0.22 –0.05 0.11
Canada-US 0.22 0.03 0.13
NZ-Australia –0.22 –0.04 0.09
NZ-Australia –0.27 –0.11 0.08
Netherlands-Germany –0.07 –0.02 –0.09
Austria-Germany –0.05 0.24 –0.02
Table 7. Correlation of Structural Shocks, 1990–2000
(A) Ignoring Unsystematic Shocks
B) Conditional on Unsystematic Shocks













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8. Counterfactuals: Inflation
Note: The vertical lines show the maximum and minimum mean quarterly rates of change forecasted from
the counterfactual “unrestricted” version of the VAR (see equation (1)). The labels indicated which
monetary  regime  produced  the  largest  or  smallest  mean  growth  rates,  regardless  whether
unsystematic  shocks  are  controlled  for.  The  horizontal  line  if  the  mean  forecast  from  the
“unrestricted” VAR based on the actual data. The horizontal axis indicates the relevant samples
over which the VARs were estimated. All series, except the real interest rate, are in first differences.
The appendix has all the detailed estimates.Figure 9. Counterfactuals: Output Growth
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Note: See notes to Figure 8.Figure 10. Counterfactuals: Real Interest Rate Levels
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Note: See notes to Figure 8.Appendix – Technical Details About Structural Model
Estimation and Counterfactual Experiments
We estimate a structural VAR of the form
Zt = A(L)εε
M
t  + B(L)εε
N
t  + δ Rt + θ Bt + β ct–1 + α r
*
t–1 (1)
The vector Z = [N; M], consisting of two sub-vectors N and M, is given by
[y,  g;  r,  π ,  ξ ]’,  where  y is  output  growth  (real  GDP),  g is  the  share  of
government (consumption) expenditures relative to GDP, r is a short-term
domestic and foreign real interest rate
51, π is the inflation rate, and ξ is the
nominal rate of currency depreciation.
52 The first two series in Z are the
non-monetary  variables,  while  the  remaining  three  are  the  monetary
indicators. A data appendix provides data sources and definitions. εε
M , εε
N  are
vectors of monetary and non-monetary innovations. The estimation of five
equations  yields  a total  of  five  shock  series.  However,  for  expositional
purposes, we classify them here into these two groupings (see below). r
* is the
real interest rate of the target country, and c is a commodity price index. R and
B are level shift and impulse dummies that define unsystematic changes in
monetary regimes that are anticipated.
53 The significance of these dummies
cannot be under-emphasized. They essentially accomplish two objectives.
First, they are meant to deal with the Lucas critique. Second, they convey the
notion  that  the  locus  of  this  study’s interpretation  of  what  is  meant  by
a “regime” focuses on the choice between a fixed versus a floating exchange
rate policy.
54 Hence, the model is conditioned, among other things, not only
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51 Calculated as the nominal short-term interest rate less current CPI inflation. It is possible
that our results are influenced by the choice of interest rates. We chose comparable interest rates
(see  Appendix)  across  the  countries  considered  but  it  is  possible  that  other  interest  rate
combinations may have been more suitable.
52 An alternative would have been to specify and estimate a joint model for each of the
candidate-target groups of countries. We feel, however, that the presence of a foreign (i.e., the
target country’s) interest rate accomplishes the same objective, as well as producing a relatively
parsimonious  model.  Indeed,  our  approach  allows  a better  focus  on  the  role  of  key  policy
instruments that exist outside a monetary union. We chose to use the nominal instead of the real
exchange rate because their overall time series properties are roughly the same when expressed
n first differences, and it is doubtful that the real exchange rate series are comparable across the
countries considered. In this connection, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, pp. 606-608).
53 A complete list of the dummies is relegated to an appendix available on request.
54 As noted earlier, the choice of a floating exchange rate regime does not by itself fulfill the
definition of a policy regime for it must be accompanied by a policy to anchor the price level
either via some form of monetary targeting, uncovered interest rate parity, or an inflation target.
The specification of the dummy variables reflects this view. on common unsystematic shocks but also on the idiosyncratic shocks that
appear to be independent of the choice of exchange rate regimes but can,
potentially,  influence  the  success  of  chosen  policies  under  the  respective
exchange rate regime. An alternative strategy would be to allow the data, as
it were, to find the location of the “breaks”. We chose not to adopt this
strategy because it tends to select dates that are close to ones that an historical
analysis would have selected in any event, as well as because the location and
the number of estimated breaks can be sensitive to the technique employed.
The identifying long-run restrictions are such that in
A(L) et = B(L) ut 
A is lower triangular and B is a diagonal matrix. The identification approach
essentially adopts the Blanchard and Quah strategy of long-run identifying
restrictions.  Restricting  the  matrix  of  long-run  responses  to  be  lower
triangular, aggregate supply shocks (i.e., output) can have permanent effects
but aggregate demand or policy shocks are not permitted to have a long-run
impact  on  output.  Similarly,  monetary  policy  shocks  (e.g.,  interest  rates,
exchange  rates)  are  not  permitted  to  have  a long-run  impact  on  output,
inflation, and fiscal policy. Fiscal shocks are permitted to have a long-run
effect on all variables save output. 
Next, we examine the impulse response functions in order to ascertain the
reaction  of  the  endogenous  variables  under  the  hypothesized  identifying
restrictions. Given the potentially large number of permutations of models we
provide only a small selection of results. Once the SVARs are estimated we
then evaluate the correlation of structural shocks for these same variables
between candidate and target countries. 
A natural  objection  to  any  such  counterfactual  is  that  the  structure  and
coefficient estimates of the model need not be invariant under the specified
scenarios. In other words, the choice of regime results in a structural shift that
cannot be adequately replicated in the data.
55Although no technique can fully
accommodate the potential implications of the type of policy change we are
contemplating here, the impact of this criticism is somewhat mitigated by
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55 In performing the counterfactuals, we constrained the residuals estimated from the VAR
whose ordering was described below equation (1). We experimented both with constraining the
“unrestricted” VAR as well as the SVAR. We found that in some cases the counterfactuals based
on the SVAR produced implausible or even explosive estimates for several of the variables in
question. Apossible explanation is that the counterfactual, while not necessarily inconsistent with
the hypothesized long-run identifying conditions, requires large corrections to the residuals from
the SVARs.making  allowances  for  the  fact  that,  for  example,  in  the  case  where  the
exchange rate is pegged, other shocks were estimated under conditions where
the εε in (1) would not have left ξ unaffected. Consequently, one should view
the assumption that ξ =0 as incorporating the additional restriction that the
structural exchange rate shock is modified to keep the exchange rate constant.
Since  it  is  unlikely  that  a peg  would  not  permit  some  movement  of  the
exchange rate we do permit the exchange rate to fluctuate within a band
whose size we can set. However, the exchange rate is mean reverting so that
the peg restriction is satisfied over the sample in question. Similarly, if the
actual model had been estimated under a pegged exchange rate with periodic
realignments the move to a floating exchange rate regime, that is adoption of
scenario (3), would require that the sum of all structural shocks be consistent
with  the  maintenance  of  uncovered  interest  rate  parity.  The  same
considerations apply for the analysis of counterfactuals in scenario (2).
Two other important choices must be made prior to estimation: The choice of
lag lengths in the VARs and the stationarity of each series in the model.
Regarding the former, a variety of lag exclusion tests (not shown) suggest that
4 lags are adequate in a VAR of 5 endogenous variables (r
* is exogenous in
the candidate countries and the systematic policy dummies are exogenous in
all models) estimated for a sample of 30 years of data. To ensure stationarity,
all raw series (i.e., log levels of output, prices, government expenditures to
GDP ratio,  nominal  exchange  rates,  and  interest  rate  levels)  were  first
differenced  following  the  outcome  of  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests  (not
shown). With the possible exception of r, and r
*, these transformations should
not  be  controversial.  Nevertheless,  we  consider  some  sensitivity  tests
regarding the impact of differencing of some series.
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Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières 
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who
have an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems,
and the conduct of monetary and regulatory policy.
SUERF  is  a network  association  of  central  bankers,  bankers  and  other
practitioners  in  the  financial  sector,  and  academics  with  the  purpose  of
analysing  and  understanding  European  financial  markets,  institutions  and
systems,  and  the  conduct  of  regulation  and  monetary  policy.  It  organises
regular  Colloquia,  lectures  and  seminars  and  each  year  publishes  several
analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located
at the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate,
personal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership
currently includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks.
SUERF is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership
comprises most of Europe’s Central Banks (29 in total, including the Bank for
International  Settlements  and  the  European  Central  Bank),  banks,  other
financial institutions and academics.
79SUERF STUDIES
1997 – 2002
1. G.M.M. Gelauff and C. den Broeder,  Governance  of  Stakeholder
relationships;  The  German  and  Dutch  experience,  Amsterdam,  1997,
ISBN 90-5143-024-8.
2. Rolf Skog, Does Sweden need a Mandatory Bid Rule, a critical analysis,
Amsterdam 1997, ISBN 90-5143-025-6.
3. Corporate  Governance  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe;  Transition
Management is a Tough Job. Two papers. Amsterdam, 1998, 
ISBN 90-5143-027-2.
1) Debora Revoltella, Financing Firms in East European Countries: An
Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs Approach
2) Peter H. Haiss and Gerhard Fink, Seven Years of Financial Market
Reform in Central Europe
4. Joseph Bisignano, Towards an Understanding of the Changing Structure
of  Financial  Intermediation;  An  Evolutionary  Theory  of  Institutional
Survival, Amsterdam, 1998, ISBN 90-5143-026-4. (out of print)
5. David T. Llewellyn, The New Economics of Banking, Amsterdam, 1999,
ISBN 90-5143-028-0.
6. John Calverley, Sarah Hewin, Kevin Grice, Emerging Stock Markets
after the Crisis, Amsterdam, 2000, ISBN 90-5143-029-9.
7. Strengthening Financial Infrastructure: Deposit Insurance and Lending of
Last Resort (two contributions), Amsterdam, 2000, ISBN 90-5143-030-2.
1) Richard Dale, Deposit Insurance in Theory and Practice
2) Christian de Boissieu and Franco Bruni, Lending of Last Resort and
Systemic Stability in the Eurozone.
8. Cem Karacadag and Michael W. Taylor, The New Capital Adequacy
Framework: Institutional Constraints and Incentive Structures, Vienna,
2000, ISBN 3-902109-00-9.
9. Miguel Sebastián and Carmen Hernansanz,  The  Spanish  Banks’
Strategy in Latin America, Vienna, 2000, ISBN 3-902109-01-7.
10. M.M.G. Fase and W.F.V. Vanthoor,  The  Federal  Reserve  System
Discussed: AComparative Analysis, Vienna, 2000, ISBN 3-902109-02-5.
11. Willem H. Buiter and ClemensGrafe , Central Banking and the Choice
of Currency Regime in Accession Countries, Vienna, 2001, 
ISBN 3-902-109-03-3.
8112. Sanjiva Prasad, Christopher J. Green, and Victor Murinde, Company
Financing, Capital Structure, and Ownership: A Survey, and Implications
for Developing Economies, Vienna, 2001, ISBN 3-902109-04-1.
13. Martin M.G. Fase, Investment in Paintings: The interaction of monetary
return and psychic income, Vienna, 2001, ISBN 3-902109-05-X.
14. Alexandre Lamfalussy, Reflections  on  the  Regulation  of  European
Securities Markets, Vienna 2001, ISBN 3-902109-06-8.
15. Italian  Mutual  Banks:  Performance,  Efficiency  and  Mergers  and
Acquisitions (two contributions), Vienna 2002, ISBN 3-902109-07-6.
1) Juan Sergio Lopez, Alessandra Appennini, Stefania P.S. Rossi,
Evidence from two different cost frontier techniques.
2) Roberto Di Salvo, Maria Carmela Mazzilis, Andrea Guidi,
Mergers and acquisitions between mutual banks in Italy: an analysis of
the effects on performance and productive efficiency.
16. ThomasReininger, Franz Schardax, Martin Summer ,  Financial
System Transition in Central Europe: The First Decade, Vienna, 2002,
ISBN 3-902109-08-4.
17. Helmut Wagner,  Implications  of  Globalization  for  Monetary  Policy,
Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-09-2.
18. Luiz Fernando De Paula,  Banking  Internationalisation  and  the
Expansion  Strategies  of  European  Banks  to  Brazil  during  the  1990s,
Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-10-6.
19. Is  there  a Future  for  Regional  Banks  and  Regional  Exchanges?  The
Strategies of Selected Austrian Finance Institutions, (four contributions),
Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-11-4.
1) David T. Llewellyn,  The  Future  for  Small  &  Regional  Banks
inEurope
2) Reinhard Ortner, What Future for Regional Banks?
3) Herbert Stepic, The Strategy of RZB in Central and Eastern Europe
4) Stefan K. Zapotocky,  The  Challenges  and  Chances  of  Regional
Exchanges
20. Thomas Dalsgaard, Jorgen Elmeskov, Cyn-Young Park,  Ongoing
Changes in the Business Cycle – Evidence and Causes, Vienna, 2002,
ISBN 3-902109-12-2.
21. Christian Harm,  Bank  Management  Between  Shareholders  and
Regulators, Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-13-0.
22. Jean-Paul Abraham, Peter van Dijcke,  European  Financial
Cross-Border Consolidation: At the Crossroads in Europe? By Exception,
Evolution or Revolution, Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-14-9.
822003
2003/1 Bert  Scholtens,  Dick  van  Wensveen,  The  Theory  of  Financial
Intermediation: An Essay on What it Does (Not) Explain, Vienna 2003,
ISBN 3-902109-15-7.
2003/2 Paola Bongini,  The  EU  Experience  in  Financial  Services
Liberalization: A Model for GATS Negotiation? Vienna 2003, 
ISBN 3-902109-16-5.
2003/3 Jean-Paul Abraham,  Introduction  by  David T. Llewellyn,
Monetary  and  Financial  Thinking  in  Europe  –  Evidence  from  Four
Decades of SUERF, Vienna 2003, ISBN 3-902109-17-3.
2003/4 Securing Financial Stability: Problems and Prospects for New EU
Members (three papers) Introduction by Morten Balling, Vienna 2003,
ISBN 3-902109-18-1
1) Michael C. Bonello, Stability  Oriented  Monetary  and  Prudential
Policies in EU Accession Countries
2) Fabrizio Saccomanni, Ensuring  Financial  Stability:  Global  and
European Perspectives
3) Claudia M. Buch, Jörn Kleinert and Peter Zajc, Foreign  Bank
Ownership: A Bonus or Threat for Financial Stability?
2003/5 Ralph Süppel,  Russia’s Financial  Markets  Boom,  Crisis  and
Recovery 1995-2001, Vienna 2003, ISBN 3-902109-19-X
2004
2004/1 Supervisory  Systems,  Fiscal  Soundness  and  International  Capital
Movement:  More  Challenges  for  new  EU  Members  (three  papers)
Introduction by Morten Balling, Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-902109-20-3
1) Andreas Grünbichler and Patrick Darlap, Integration of European
Supervisory Systems: Harmonisation or Unification?
2) Sinikka Salo, The Relevance of Fiscal Soundness for Monetary Stability
3) Leslie Lipschitz, Timothy Lane and Alex Mourmouras, How Capital
Flowswill influence the EU Accession Countires of Central and Eastern
Europe
2004/2 European  Monetary  and  Financial  Integration:  Evolution  and
Prospects (five speeches), Introduction by Eduard H Hochreiter and
David T Llewellyn, Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-902109-21-1
1) Monetary  and  Financial  Thinking  in  Europe  since  the  Sixties:
Evidence from the SUERF Colloquia. By Jean-Paul Abraham
832) Fiscal  Discipline  in  a Monetary  Union:  Issues  for  the  Euro Area.
By Franco Bruni
3) Financial Globalisation and Financial Market Integration in Europe:
Challenges  Ahead  for  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks,
by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy
4) How to complete the Integration of the European Financial Market,
by Robert Raymond
5) Optimal Currency Areas and Implementation of Economic Policies,
by Jean-Claude Trichet
2004/3 Northern and Eastern Enlargement of EMU: Do Structural Reforms
Matter? By Andrew HughesHallett , Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and
Christian Richter, Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-902109-22-X
2004/4 Electronic Purses in Euroland: Why do Penetration and Usage Rates
Differ? By Leo van Hove, Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-902109-23-8
Order Form: www.suerf.org
84